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Abstract 
The Haitian Threat 
Humanitarianism, Security, and Internally Displaced Haitians Following the 2010 
Earthquake 
 
Kelsy Yeargain 
The American University in Cairo 
under the supervision of Dr Agnes Czjaka 
 
 This thesis explores the relationships between internally displaced Haitians, 
humanitarian organizations, and the international community. The thesis focuses 
primarily on humanitarianism as a mechanism of security and the framing of displaced 
Haitians as security threats. I engaged with the discourses of the media and humanitarian 
organizations, as well as interviews conducted with aid workers in Haiti following the 
earthquake. Exploring the dynamic relationships of humanitarian organizations, the 
international community, the Haitian government and the internally displaced Haitians, 
this thesis attempts to problematize the many assumptions about international 
humanitarian aid and the Haitian population. There are three major focuses of the thesis: 
the increasing use of security in the distribution of humanitarian aid, humanitarianism 
operating as a mechanism of security and the construction of meaning and threat.     
By complicating humanitarian assistance as not just an act of goodwill towards 
mankind and by arguing that the failures of delivering humanitarian aid post-earthquake 
were not the result of inefficiencies, violent Haitians or a corrupt “failed state.” They are 
instead the result of humanitarianism functioning as a mechanism of governance, the 
prioritization of security in the distribution of aid, and how Haitians and the Haitian state 
are discursively represented as both hopeless and caught in a vicious cycle of poverty and 
violence, and as potential security threats to themselves, to Haitian women and to aid 
workers. This thesis discusses the very foundation of humanitarianism itself and the 
relationship between humanitarianism as an industry, the international system, security, 
representational practices and the construction of threats and ask how these multiple 
issues intersect to create the kind of humanitarianism that we see in post-earthquake 
Haiti.  
This thesis explores how the dominant narratives about humanitarianism and 
Haitians are a reflection of the unequal power distribution of the international community 
and how those narratives construct to portray Haitians and internally displaced 
populations in a particular way to help justify political interventions, which in turn 
recreate and reconstruct the meanings and identities of the population. Deconstructing 
dominant narratives about humanitarianism allows for a more nuanced exploration of 
what exactly humanitarianism is and how it functions as a mechanism of power, 
governance and security.  
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 1 
Introduction 
“Until Jan. 12, Haiti was a “fragile state” desperate for help to develop a working economy and 
effective institutions. Now it is something much worse — a charnel house with tens of thousands 
of corpses in a capital city laid waste” (Traub 2010). 
 
“Twenty years in inner-city ERs, I thought I had seen it all until ... Haiti. Flying in you feel like you are 
being dropped into a war zone — helicopters, tents, military vehicles, cargo boxes and searchlights”  
(Plantz 2010). 
 
 
The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) headquarters in Haiti 
are located near the airport in Port Au Prince. The security is tight; men in blue helmets 
patrol the area in armored tanks. The complex is surrounded by walls and fences topped 
with barbed wire, and the gates are manned by tanks and men with rifles. Each day lines 
of Haitians wait outside in the blistering sun for the opportunity to enter the complex. 
After the earthquake, MINUSTAH became one of the primary headquarters for most of 
the United Nations (UN) organizations and most of the interagency cluster meetings were 
held in this complex. The majority of Haitians waiting outside were camp managers, 
local NGO workers, or members of camp committees who were asking for meetings with 
one of the agencies located inside. In order to enter the complex, Haitians needed a letter 
of approval and their names had to be on a list. They had to produce identification cards 
and have their bags searched and their bodies patted down after walking through a metal 
detector. It is a site of security. This is not unusual in Haiti. In fact, the scene repeats 
itself at most entrances to the humanitarian organization complexes. What is interesting 
about this story is not just the securitization itself, but the ways in which security 
manifests itself in Haiti. When I wanted to enter the complex, I was ushered to the front 
of the line. The security officers asked to see my American passport, and I was escorted 
around the metal detector and into the complex. Although I had approval, and my name 
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was on “the list” the security officers never checked for my name. A young, blonde, 
American passport-holding woman is apparently not a security threat.  
 This story reveals two of the major themes in this thesis. The first is the increasing 
use of security mechanisms in the distribution and functions of humanitarian aid. The 
second is the construction of identities, meanings and, ultimately, threats. I will discuss 
how this and multiple other factors are influencing how humanitarian organizations 
operate in Haiti. The thesis reveals how international organizations have increasing 
control over the everyday lives of internally displaced Haitians, and how security 
measures dictate access to goods and services. The thesis also reveals a certain duality 
inherent in the security: Security is experienced differently based on the population and 
the individual. Enmeshing humanitarianism and traditional security mechanisms makes 
humanitarianism a mechanism of security. 
 When I began this research project I wanted to answer a seemingly simple question: 
Why was the United States military deployed to distribute aid in Haiti? I knew the answer 
would be much more complicated than the dominant narratives. I knew the answer was 
grounded in the increasing securitization of societies, the construction of Haitians as 
security threats, and the role of the international community in how aid is distributed. I 
also thought that the answer could be easily sketched, that I could draw on socio-
historical and economic factors to illuminate the answers. However, after spending time 
in Haiti, conducting interviews with aid workers from international aid organizations 
such as World Vision, the American Red Cross, the International Committee of Red 
Cross Red Crescent societies (ICRC), the International Organization for Migration 
(IOM), the World Food Program (WFP), Samaritans Purse, MINUSTAH, the United 
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States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the United States military, as 
well as speaking to Haitian non-profit workers, and internally displaced Haitians1, I 
realized I was ultimately asking the wrong question and attempting to answer it in the 
wrong way. The deployment of US troops to Haiti was just one small part of a much 
larger puzzle. By utilizing discourse analysis of the media and academic articles about 
Haiti and the policies and programs of international humanitarian organizations, I 
recognized the multiple layers and relationships that lie behind how humanitarian 
agencies responded to the 2010 earthquake in Haiti and reveal the complicated 
relationships between security, risks, humanitarianism, and the international community. 
Throughout this thesis I will use  “international community” to signify the sets of 
relationships between nation-states and international organizations. The term 
international community does not imply that all actors within the global political arena 
“behave” the same, but does refer to the often hegemonic control of the production of 
knowledge, discourses and practices of particular actors within global politics.  
 Michel-Rolph Trouillot in Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History 
(1995) writes about which narratives matter, which stories are retold and which remain 
silent. Haiti, since its beginning as a colony, has had only some of its stories retold, some 
of its histories recounted. Who tells the stories about Haiti? Who has a voice about the 
realities of Haitian life, both pre- and post-earthquake? When international humanitarian 
organizations decide on policies and programs in Haiti, whose stories are heard, and 
recounted, and determine how humanitarianism is practiced? The narratives about Haiti, 
especially in the international community at large are discursively created and recreated                                                         
1 All of the interviewees asked to remain anonymous. In some cases they allowed me to note the 
organization they worked for.  
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by non-Haitians, by aid workers, missionaries, academics and politicians. The identities 
and meanings about Haiti are created and constructed and then reproduced by outside 
forces.  
 The cluster meetings I attended in the MINUSTAH headquarters were held almost 
entirely in English or French (instead of Haitian Creole). The majority of the people 
attending were not Haitian. At the meetings, the representatives spoke of the “parallel 
structures” that operate in Haiti. Parallel structures were defined as the three pillars of 
humanitarian assistance: The United Nations, the Haitian government and the NGO 
community. The word parallel implies exactly what was occurring: parallel lines (even if 
they are “pillars”) do not intersect. Each operates separately, with different goals and 
different strategies. Although there were constant debates on the role of the Haitian 
government in the distribution of aid and the rebuilding of Haiti, a consensus was never 
reached.  
 The cluster meetings illuminate, first, that the humanitarian industry is a 
mechanism of governance operating outside of Haitian law and governance. The imagery 
of parallel structures reveals a common narrative of humanitarianism: It posits things as 
being individual, unrelated, and distinct. Discussions about humanitarianism are often 
framed in either/or terms: You are either a proponent of human rights or a defender of 
state sovereignty; humanitarian organizations are either neutral and apolitical, or they are 
the direct result of hegemonic policies by the United States and other Western powers. 
The discourse on Haiti was similarly structured: Haiti will either have security, through 
means of surveillance, policing and monitoring, or Haiti will descend into chaos; there 
are Haitians who are vulnerable and Haitians who are not; there are Haitians who deserve 
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aid, because of their vulnerability and there are Haitians who do not because of their 
violence and corruption. Each supposedly exists separately and one must ultimately 
choose a side.  
 Discussions about humanitarianism also highlight the seemingly natural conflicts 
that complicate humanitarian aid distribution. In the case of the cluster meetings the 
parallel structures analogy suggests the inability of the Haitian state (because of its 
failure, its lack of good governance, its corruption) to work with the UN and the NGOs. 
Haitian men are framed as being in conflict with Haitian women, aid workers and 
themselves. Development cannot be achieved without security. There is the “first world,” 
which has the knowledge and the ability (and the money and the power) to provide 
humanitarian assistance in the “third world,” a place that stands in stark contrast to the 
first world, a place that needs, requires, desires first world assistance. The first world has 
a humanitarian duty to intervene, not just to end human suffering but also to ensure that 
nothing spills over into neighboring countries.  
 In addition to questioning the relationships between humanitarian organizations, 
states and the Haitian population, this thesis will attempt to problematize many of the 
assumptions behind humanitarian assistance. I hope to suggest that the issues posed as 
either/or are not so simple. They intersect and overlap. The human rights regime is not 
necessarily in conflict state sovereignty. Haitian men are not always rioting, looting and 
raping. The Haitian state cannot be contrasted so starkly with other nation states, because 
of its “bad governance” and state failure. In the following chapters, I will attempt to 
complicate humanitarian assistance as not just an act of goodwill towards man-kind and 
argue that the failures of delivering humanitarian aid post-earthquake were not the result 
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of inefficiencies, violent Haitians or a corrupt “failed state.” They are instead the result of 
humanitarianism functioning as a mechanism of governance, the prioritization of security 
in the distribution of aid, and how Haitians and the Haitian state are discursively 
represented as both hopeless and caught in a vicious cycle of poverty and violence, and as 
potential security threats to themselves, to Haitian women and to aid workers.  
 Delivering humanitarian assistance, rebuilding an already impoverished country 
that has been destroyed by an earthquake and coordinating with multiple organizations 
and governments with different objectives and policies is difficult. As you walk through 
the streets of Haiti with piles of rubble and destroyed buildings all around, it can 
sometimes feel not just difficult but impossible. This thesis, however, is not about the 
operational barriers that humanitarian organizations and the Haitian government and 
people face. It is not about how there needs to be more coordination between 
organizations and the government or how to more efficiently distribute aid. I will discuss 
the very foundation of humanitarianism itself and the relationship between 
humanitarianism as an industry, the international system, security, representational 
practices and the construction of threats and ask how these multiple issues intersect to 
create the kind of humanitarianism that we see in post-earthquake Haiti. 
 In the following chapters I will explore the complexities of the relationships 
embedded in international humanitarian assistance. In the first chapter, I will discuss how 
humanitarianism is now the primary language and means of addressing global 
inequalities, poverty and violence. Humanitarianism also manifests itself in political 
interventions- when a state is deemed unable to adequately respond to the needs of its 
population, humanitarian organizations are expected to respond instead. How the 
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humanitarian organizations respond depends on the perceived causes of the inequalities 
or violence, the mandates of the organizations and the political goals of the organizations 
and their funders. As those perceived causes become increasingly framed as matters of 
“insecurity,” humanitarianism itself is reflecting a move towards securitization, which I 
will discuss in the second chapter. This is revealed on a variety of levels, from the 
deployment of military troops, to armored vehicles for aid workers, to how aid is 
distributed and how internally displaced population (IDP) camps are run. The focus on 
security as the primary goal of humanitarianism is justified by the construction of 
particular meanings and identities about the population receiving aid, in particular the 
constructing of the populations as a threat in need of being secured against.  
 Power dynamics are inherent in each of these sets of relationships and factors. The 
ability to decide who is able to give aid, and who deserves to receive it reflects the 
political landscape and the dominant discourses about poverty deployed by the 
international community. The language of humanitarianism is broadening to include 
military operations, embargoes, and even private business investment (as in the case of 
microcredit loans). The mandate of the United Nations as expressed in their charter is 
to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective 
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for 
the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring 
about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and 
international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations 
which might lead to a breach of the peace  (Charter of the United Nations, Chapter I 
1945). 
  
The United Nations was created to ensure peace and security, but how exactly the 
organization is expected to do so has changed in many ways since its formation in 1945.  
 The third chapter will explore how impoverished individuals, particularly young, 
 8 
black men are considered a security threat. Haitians, with their “violent history” and 
extreme poverty, represent the epitome of a risky population. Moreover, Haiti, as a failed 
state, is considered a threat to the international system of nation-states. Military 
intervention in the name of humanitarianism is viewed as a viable and efficient means of 
ensuring human security. However, security is not necessarily about saving lives, but also 
about the management and maintenance of a population. Security is about maintaining a 
level of control over the population and ensuring continuity.  
 I will draw on Foucault’s (2008) notion of biopolitics and Agamben’s (1995) 
interpretation of homo sacer, or bare life. Biopolitics and the bare life are frequently 
discussed in articles critical of humanitarian practices and securitization. Haitians are 
discursively represented as being at the extremity of human suffering, as being able to be 
killed but not sacrificed (Agamben 1995). But the focus of this thesis is not on how 
Haitians are homo sacer, or even how humanitarianism is a representation of Foucault’s 
biopower, as some, like Fassin, have argued. According to Fassin, 
Humanitarian intervention is a biopolitics insofar as it sets up and manages refugee 
camps, establishes protected corridors in order to gain access to war casualties, 
develops statistical tools to measure malnutrition, and makes use of communication 
media to bear witness to injustice in the world (Fassin 2007: 501) 
 
The focus of the thesis, however, are the dualities and ambiguities that exist in 
discussions and understandings of humanitarianism. Understanding humanitarianism 
requires picking apart the seemingly disparate parts and contingencies, rather than relying 
on simple cause and effect. For example we cannot simply say the earthquake was one of 
the worst tragedies to happen in the 21st century because Haiti was poor or because Haiti 
is a failed state. We also should not suggest that it was difficult to distribute aid and 
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humanitarian organizations needed security mechanisms because Haitian males are 
violent and dangerous. Instead, I hope to explore how the multi-layered relationships and 
realities that exist between humanitarian organizations, the international system, the 
construction of threats, and the securitization of societies create a more complicated 
question, one that demands we ask more questions: Why is Haiti so poor? Why are 
Haitians males discursively represented as violent and dangerous? Why is Haiti a failed 
state? What, exactly, is a failed state? This thesis is a critical, political and theoretical 
engagement with humanitarianism and intervention and the processes and relationships of 
humanitarian aid.  
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Chapter One: Humanitarianism, Intervention, and Haiti 
Understanding the international response to the 2010 earthquake in Haiti first requires an 
analysis of humanitarian intervention both broadly and within the particular case of Haiti. 
This chapter will construct a framework through which to critically engage with the 
humanitarian response in Haiti by situating it within the theory and practice of 
humanitarianism and the history of intervention in Haiti. By conceptualizing 
humanitarianism as a form of political intervention, and placing it within an historical 
context the chapter will reveal how humanitarianism adapted to the relationships between 
states, international organizations and displaced populations. The chapter will present the 
history of humanitarianism in three parts:  first, the origins of humanitarianism as the 
giving of assistance at the battlefield, second, the Cold War period and humanitarianism’s 
link to developmentalism, and third, the post Cold War period in which human rights 
became the main focus of humanitarian aid and action. Haiti is a particularly interesting 
site of humanitarian intervention because of the long history of international involvement 
and the ways in which Haitians are represented in Western media and academia. 
The first section of this chapter explores how humanitarianism, as a form of 
intervention, has transformed due to changing interpretations of the role of the 
humanitarian organization in the global system of nation-states. The second section will 
discuss Haiti’s history of intervention. It will show that, on the one hand, the history of 
intervention mirrors the larger changes and themes within the humanitarian industry. Yet, 
the representational and discursive practices about Haiti (which I will discuss in chapter 
three) have particular historical roots in previous international interventions in Haiti. The 
last section will discuss the 2010 earthquake and the international response by focusing 
 11 
on four of the major humanitarian organizations (which includes the United States 
military, operating in a “humanitarian” role), to illuminate how the international 
community responded to the earthquake in light of the historical and political 
developments influencing humanitarian operations and their move towards securitization.  
How the world decides to respond to the seemingly endless number of crises and 
emergencies is a reflection of the political, economic and social environment. For many 
years humanitarianism was viewed as something entirely outside of politics: a salve for 
the wounds of global inequalities, wars, and injustice. Michael Barnett (2005, 2008), 
Joanna Macrae (2001) and Alex Bellamy (2003) write about how post Cold War 
humanitarianism is being transformed into a more politicized form of intervention. I 
argue, however, that the distance between politics and humanitarianism was never as 
great as many assume.  
Humanitarianism is by nature a form of intervention. Regardless of the 
proclaimed apolitical and neutral foundation of humanitarianism, the very act of giving 
aid reflects global structures, conflicts and power relations. The perceived simplicity of 
giving humanitarian aid to persons in need reflects both global and domestic power 
dynamics: Who is able to give aid? Who is deemed to be both worthy of and in need? 
What form does aid come in, how should it be distributed, and for how long? The 
questions reveal the inherently political, non-neutral nature of humanitarian aid. Hans 
Haug in his book Humanity for All: The International Red Cross Red Crescent Movement 
suggests that, “an institution or a movement is neutral when it renounces to participate in 
a conflict or altercation and abstains from any interference” (1993: 3). His definition 
defends of the neutrality of the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement. What I argue, 
 12 
however, is that providing humanitarian aid, by virtue of being a form of interference, 
qualifies as participation in a conflict. 
 Relying on a definition of humanitarianism as intervention is not assigning a 
negative or positive value to humanitarianism, but instead allows for a more critical and 
nuanced analysis by placing humanitarian intervention in a political and historical 
context. The point is not to make a judgment and then dole out praise or condemnation, 
but instead to explore the complex history of intervention and consider the multiple 
reasons states and international organizations decide to intervene and the multiple ways 
in which they do. As humanitarianism changes in shape and form it is not transforming 
into something entirely different, but is adapting and morphing in response to changing 
relationships, situations, and discourses about who needs aid, and who has the ability and 
knowledge to give it.  
Haiti is an interesting case because it is considered a “failed state,” and behind 
every humanitarian intervention, from food packets to military assistance, echo 
sentiments of the failure of the state. The nation-state is expected to provide for and 
protect its citizens and if a state is unable to respond adequately to crises and 
emergencies, it is failing to provide for its citizens. Humanitarian intervention is the 
action taken by state and non-state actors to respond to the state’s inability to respond. 
Analysis of the changing discourses of why states have crises and why some states are 
unable to adequately respond allows for an exploration of how humanitarianism both 
shapes and is shaped by dominant discourses of international relations and the 
international community. 
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History of Humanitarianism as a Form of Intervention 
This section explores how ideas about and interpretations of humanitarianism go in and 
out of vogue depending on how organizations and states determine the causes of 
humanitarian crises, as well as the relationships of nation-states to each other and to the 
international community. Before proceeding to the historical analysis, it is important to 
note that humanitarianism has not simply followed a linear path from simple to more 
complex models. If one is to interpret all humanitarianism as an act of intervention, it 
may, along with situating humanitarianism in a historical context, be constructive to think 
of the types of humanitarian intervention as distributed along a spectrum. The giving of 
food aid following a natural disaster may be a less intrusive form of intervention than 
coordinating and funding infrastructure development projects. Development 
interventions, like the provision of microcredit to women in rural areas with the stated 
goal of “empowering women” is a less direct intervention than giving military aid to one 
side in a civil war or interstate conflict, which in turn is less of an intervention than 
military intervention in the name of human rights. However, they are all still forms of 
intervention and each is the result of the political environment and conditions of the 
conflict. 
 Humanitarianism will be loosely defined as an industry that is bureaucratically 
structured to provide assistance to people who are affected, or could be affected, by 
emergencies and crises (such as war, famine, extreme poverty or natural and man made 
disasters) across international lines. The thesis will focus on how the international 
humanitarian industry was created and perpetuated by international actors to deal with 
events across international lines, with a concentration on internally displaced populations. 
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By analyzing humanitarianism from this angle, the thesis will explore the relationships 
between the actors giving humanitarian assistance and the actors receiving it. By focusing 
particularly on issues of power, sovereignty and representational practices, I hope to offer 
the beginnings of a critical history of humanitarianism. I will start the discussion with the 
Red Cross Movement because it represents a particular moment in humanitarian 
assistance, and for many years was the model for humanitarian organizations.  
 Henry Dunant started the Red Cross Movement in 1863. The Red Cross and Red 
Crescent societies were not the first international humanitarian organizations, but their 
foundation represents a critical turning point for humanitarianism (Haug 1993). The Red 
Cross, which was envisioned by Dunant after witnessing the Battle of Solferino in 1859, 
was created to provide assistance to people wounded in battle. According to A Memory of 
Solferino published by the International Committee for the Red Cross, 
In normal circumstances, in the organized society in which he usually lives, man 
is protected by laws and finds sustenance close at hand. But there are also 
situations, such as armed conflicts or natural disasters, when society is thrown out 
of kilter, laws are violated, man’s natural environment is turned into chaos, and 
his safety, health and very survival are threatened: in times like those the Red 
Cross strives to help and protect the victims (Hay 1986: 1).  
 
Populations throughout Europe quickly accepted the Red Cross Movement and began 
forming their own national societies and many agreed that there was a need for an 
international organization to address the human suffering caused by war. Before the Red 
Cross, there were many humanitarian societies that addressed poverty and other social 
ills, but the Red Cross represents a move toward the internationalization and 
bureaucratization of what would eventually become a full-blown industry. 
 15 
 The International Committee of the Red Cross is the international wing of the Red 
Cross Movement. It is not affiliated with any particular state and it has a different 
mandate and position from the Red Cross and Red Crescent societies, which are the 
national organizations. Although National Red Cross and Red Crescent organizations 
often have different mandates and provide different services, they are generally 
concerned with direct service delivery. For example, during World War I, National Red 
Cross societies provided ambulance services and medical personnel and supplies.  
 One of the main distinctions of the National Red Cross movements, like other 
direct aid agencies like Doctors Without Borders (Medecins Sans Frontiers), is how and 
to whom aid is distributed. Although life is rarely as clear-cut as policies might suggest, 
direct aid delivery ideally has no conditions attached or long-term goals in mind. Red 
Cross and MSF give aid, either as food packets or medical help to people in need. 
Naturally, the determination of who is able to give aid and who deserves to receive it 
reflect inherently unequal power relationships, but this type of aid is a more minor form 
of intervention. The organizations generally view themselves as apolitical, or outside the 
realm of politics.  
 An analysis of Red Cross documents from Haiti between 1970 and 1985, (chosen 
because of their public availability), show little to no focus on the political situation in the 
country at the time. In 1970, the ICRC helped the Haitian Red Cross open a blood bank. 
In 1971 the ICRC sent “two tons of powdered milk for the Haitian medico-social 
programme for the benefit of the waifs and strays of Cap-Haitien, and a Land Rover were 
loaded on a ship sailing from Rotterdam to Port-au-Prince” (Library of Congress 1970). 
In 1985 the ICRC sent a delegation to Haiti to explore the detention centers of political 
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prisoners. The ICRC makes no mention of what it found during its expedition, but it did 
determine how much food aid was needed for Haitian citizens. (Library of Congress 
1985). Jean-Claude Duvalier was the president of Haiti in 1985 and it can be assumed 
that the conditions of the political prisoners did not match with international expectations 
and norms. However, the only aid that was ultimately distributed was food aid. This 
distribution of food aid represents, first, the international community’s unwillingness to 
comment on the conditions of Haiti under the dictatorship and second, the focus of the 
ICRC on direct aid distribution instead of the protection of human rights. 
 Traditional humanitarian intervention has been criticized for not just failing to 
address root causes of conflict, but also for fueling war. As Ben Barber has argued,  
Large numbers of refugees menaced by starvation and disease make for pathos 
and dramatic press that attract aid dollars from international humanitarian 
organizations and foreign governments. The aid that flows to the camps where the 
refugees are gathered can be skimmed by militants based in the camps, as well as 
local business people and military and administrative officials of the host 
government (1997: 8).  
 
Barber’s criticism has been repeated many times. Humanitarian workers have themselves 
expressed concern about the inability to determine who truly “deserves” aid and the perils 
of giving aid to people who are “cheating the system” or are not entitled to aid. The 
inability of humanitarian aid workers to determine who constitutes a combatant and who 
is a civilian is a particularly salient and recurring “problem”. The phenomenon of 
“guerilla wars” in which the lines between “enemies” and “innocents” is difficult to 
decipher has been seen in Haiti. The violence in Haiti is spread out among the population 
and is generally directed at supporters of one political group by another, with the military 
switching between backing the government or anti-government forces. The difficulty in 
distinguishing between deserving and not deserving has become so acute in Haiti that 
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even before the earthquake the entire population was treated as if they were potential 
threats or combatants. Therefore, because the Haiti’s past humanitarian experiences, 
when the earthquake hit, Haitians were considered a threat to themselves and to others 
instead of merely disaster victims. This response by humanitarian organizations reveals 
this representation of Haitians. I will discuss this issue in greater detail in the third 
chapter. 
 The Red Cross and other emergency, need-based organizations were also 
frequently criticized for their desire to not to choose sides in political conflicts and 
remain “apolitical” despite the political nature of intervention. For example, the Red 
Cross was criticized for not speaking out against Nazi concentration camps during World 
War II (Esbrook 2007).2 Additionally, relief aid agencies are also criticized for not being 
“capacity building” or for creating a cycle of dependency (Okaru-Bisant 1999, Bauer and 
Sen 2001, Loxley and Sackey 2008). The stated “apolitical” nature of such organizations 
requires they should directly give aid and not address the structural issues for why 
countries need aid. This criticism came following the formal end of colonialism, when 
poverty in the third world was seen as the cause for the emergencies and displacement. 
The need for organizations to focus on the root causes allowed for a shift in 
humanitarianism. However, there are many humanitarian organizations that still focus on 
relief work. Following the end of WWII, developmentalism and its predecessor 
modernization theory became the prevalent schools of thought for understanding why                                                         
2 Documents have surfaced following World War II that suggest the Red Cross societies were aware of the 
conditions at the Nazi concentration camps, but for various reasons chose to not publicly speak out against 
the camps. 
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some countries are poor and in need of aid. Development and modernization arose from 
the idea that societies can be ranked in stages, from the “traditional” underdeveloped 
societies to the modern industrialized societies (Rostow 1990). In the 1950s and 1960s 
development projects focused on modernizing infrastructures in the “third world.”  
 The development paradigm has undergone a variety of changes since the 1950s 
but the underlying assumption remains the same: Some countries are underdeveloped or 
developing, whereas others have become developed. It is up to the developed countries, 
and their humanitarian organizations, to help the developing societies “catch up.” 
Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis to fully engage in criticisms of 
developmentalism, I bring up development because it is a form of “humanitarian 
intervention” from the international community. The attempt of humanitarian 
organizations to develop a country, society or community reflects the desire of the 
organization to help the populations “develop” in the image of Western nation-states. 
Developmentalism is a means of intervening in the economic policies, social structures, 
and governance of the population.  
 Developmentalism arose from the inability of international humanitarian 
institutions to address the root causes of emergencies and the displacement of populations 
(Rostow 1990). Following the World Wars, as many crises shifted to the newly 
independent colonies, states and international organizations adjusted many of their 
policies to address why some countries need aid and why some do not. This relates to the 
issue discussed earlier, namely the ability of a state to respond to its own emergencies. As 
colonialism ended and inequalities between nation states became more pronounced, the 
humanitarian industry shifted its focus to reflect this perceived inability of less developed 
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states to adequately respond to humanitarian crises. The level, amount or perhaps 
character of humanitarian intervention changed to adapt to the emerging development 
discourse.  
 Global economic development proved to be a more difficult task than originally 
perceived. Communities and countries that were targets of development programs did not 
always develop economically. According to Ovaska (2003),  
Even though some countries, notably in East Asia, have managed to break out of 
poverty, many of the poorest countries have actually seen their real per capita 
incomes decline since the 1970s. More than one billion people still live on less 
than $1 a day. Many of the advances in basic health care and education in the last 
few decades have been negated by the rapid spread of HIV/AIDS, particularly in 
the world’s poorest countries (175).  
 
The inability of countries to overcome poverty despite the large amounts of money, 
experts, and technology flowing from rich to poor countries led to questions about the 
causes of poverty. Why were some countries able to “develop” whereas others were not?  
 One infamous story about developmentalism gone awry is that of the elimination 
of the Haitian black pigs during the 1980s. “Starting in May 1982, all of Haiti’s pigs were 
slaughtered to prevent an epidemic of African swine fever from spreading to the U.S. 
mainland (to this day, Haitians point to this episode as a proof of a giant U.S. conspiracy 
to destroy Haiti)” (Girard 2002: 30).  Joan Dayan, in A Few Stories about Haiti, or, 
Stigma Revisited (2004) describes how the United States encouraged the Haitian 
government to destroy the black pigs:  
Black pigs, also known as "creole pigs," had always been the staple of the 
peasant’s life in the countryside. Black pigs were basic, necessary, and blessed. A 
few years before "Baby" Doc left for exile, the US Health Department warned 
about the dangers of a swine flu epidemic in Haiti. Hundreds of peasants lost their 
black pigs, their primary means of living (172).  
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The creole pigs were small and able to survive on the mountainous ranges of Haiti. The 
large, white Iowa pigs sent from the United States to replace the creole pigs were unable 
to survive. They needed expensive food and were unable to scavenge for themselves in 
the mountains. Most of the pigs either died or were sent to live on farms that were able to 
properly provide for them. This story is not just about pigs, or even about the United 
States’ insistence on providing development assistance without the background 
knowledge about whether their methods are compatible with the local environment. It 
also reflects the power that the United States health department had over the Haitian 
state. The ability to convince a government to kill all of its peasant’s pigs speaks volumes 
about the role the United States government has in the management of the Haitian state.  
 Economic development was the major focus of humanitarian intervention during 
the Cold War period. Developmentalism certainly still exists today, and other types of 
humanitarian intervention, such as direct aid or military intervention also existed during 
the Cold War, but during that period two issues in particular influenced the discourses of 
humanitarian intervention. The first was the stalemate within the United Nations and the 
Security Council. The Security Council, which is made up of five permanent members 
(China, France, United Kingdom, Russia, and the United States), was established with the 
stated aim of maintaining peace and security (Charter of the United Nations, Chapter V, 
1945). Military interventions in third world countries had a different nature and reflected 
the power struggles between Cold War actors. The second issue was the idea of fighting 
poverty as a means of fighting the Cold War. Third world countries were seen as the 
battleground of communism and capitalism, where different parties attempted to develop 
countries to prove the supremacy of their ideology. As Murphey writes, “Ideological 
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divergences virtually prevented the Security Council from acting in cases of outright 
aggression, let alone in cases involving widespread deprivations of internationally 
recognized human rights” (1996: 84).  
The rise in the prominence of human rights discourses came with the decline of 
the Cold War politics. Human rights are defined by proponents as “rights held by 
individuals simply because they are part of the human species. They are rights shared 
equally be everyone regardless of sex, race, nationality, and economic development. 
They are universal in content” (Ishay 2008: 3). The 1990s saw a dramatic increase in the 
popularity of the Human Rights Regime, defined by Thomas Buergenthal as consisting 
of,  
a web of institutions and mechanisms, and of an ever-expanding body of 
international human rights norms. The institutions and norms that constitute the 
UN human rights regime have their source in the UN Charter and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights on the one hand and in a series of UN human rights 
treaties on the other. (1997: 1). 
 
The 1990s also witnessed a rise in the number of human rights interventions. As the Cold 
War stalemate in the United Nations Security Council dissolved, intervening in the name 
of human rights violations became increasingly justified. Human rights organizations 
proliferated and by the 1990s, 
you couldn’t escape it. The better-known Western organizations-the International 
Commission of Jurists, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch-roamed 
the globe looking for infractions. NATO prosecuted a war in the name of "human 
rights." Less well known to Europeans and North Americans were the hundreds of 
NGOs outside Europe and the United States defining themselves as human rights 
agencies, almost all of them with birth dates no earlier than 1985 (Cmiel 2004: 
117). 
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According to Ottaway and Lacina (2003), the number of United Nations peacekeeping 
missions, or interventions in the name of peace or human rights, has increased 
dramatically. From the creation of the UN in 1945 to 1989 there were fifteen 
peacekeeping missions and all but three were interstate. However, from 1989 to 2003 
there were forty missions and only seven of them were interstate. These numbers do not 
include the number of state-led interventions that were approved by the United Nations 
but deployed by individual states or coalitions of states (Ottaway and Lacina 2003).  
 Additionally, as humanitarian organizations became larger and better able to deal 
with complex issues, and as traditional forms of humanitarianism continued to fail to end 
or prevent conflict or massive population displacement, the human rights regime is 
increasingly framed as the manner in which the international community should respond. 
For example, Tanja Schumer (2008) writes, “The British variant of New 
Humanitarianism extends beyond the immediate mandate of traditional humanitarian 
emergency assistance to save life. It is intended to address the root causes of conflict, 
prevent the negative side effects of aid and support human rights” (1). Schumer uses 
“new humanitarianism” to describe how humanitarianism has changed in response to the 
human rights discourses.  
 It follows that if states, humanitarian organizations or human rights advocacy 
groups are unable to bring about human rights, it is then up to the international 
community to step in and force governments to uphold the human rights principles. 
Human rights and humanitarianism are now framed as broad justifications for military 
intervention:  
U.S. military interventions since the Cold War have been in response to 
humanitarian crises. In the past traditional civilian relief organizations could 
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handle them with a good degree of success. Unfortunately contemporary 
humanitarian crises tend to result from internal conflicts that produce 
environments so unstable and so violent that relief organizations are unable to 
operate effectively (DiPrizio 2002: 3).  
  
Changes in the discourses of international affairs, from poverty elimination to protecting 
human rights has led to an increase in the use of military force in the name of human 
rights. As Rony Brauman (2004) notes, 
The Kosovo war provided the occasion for an extreme intensification of 
humanitarian rhetoric in its most militaristic version. The armed intervention was 
intended, or so it appeared, to “prevent a humanitarian crisis” (Jacques Chirac) by 
means of bombings similarly qualified as “humanitarian” (Vaclav Havel): charged 
with the task of maintaining spaces of humanity at the heart of the war, 
humanitarianism became a clear source of legitimization for violence (397).  
  
With the end of the Cold War and decolonization and emergent human rights 
regime, issues of state sovereignty came to the fore in ways that have not done before. 
The debate between human rights or state sovereignty is often posed as a dichotomy in 
which one must choose a side, either for or against humanitarian intervention, either for 
state sovereignty or for an international human rights regime.  Jennifer Welsh (2004) 
discusses the perceived conflict between human rights and state sovereignty as follows: 
“At the heart of the debate is the alleged tension between the principle of state 
sovereignty, a defining pillar of the United Nations system and international law, and the 
evolving international norms related to human rights and the use of force” (1). The 
international human rights regime is designed to protect the rights of persons who do not 
have the protection of their own state. However, this is more difficult than it appears. As 
Hannah Arendt remarked: 
The Rights of Man, after all, had been defined as “inalienable” because they were 
supposed to be independent of all governments; but it turned out that the moment 
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human beings lacked their own government and had to fall back upon their 
minimum rights, no authority was left to protect them and no institution was 
willing to guarantee them (1958: 292). 
  
Despite the attempts of the international community to internationalize a human rights 
regime, human rights instead are often only enforceable as citizen rights. The state is thus 
in charge of the protection of the “human rights” of its citizens, but when a state fails to 
do so, the international community is now expected, at least in some cases, to intervene 
on behalf of the populations who are no longer receive human rights from their country. 
The United Nations and other humanitarian institutions attempt to step in when 
governments fail, but despite their claim of impartiality they are still reflections of the 
very nation-state system of which they are attempting to subvert, because human rights 
are ultimately only enforceable by states.  
 The rise in the popularity and frequency of military interventions in the name of 
human rights has led many to bemoan the decline of original humanitarian principles. 
This is not necessarily the case. Perhaps human rights has been embraced by political 
actors who support military intervention, but this reflects not a complete shift in 
humanitarianism from apolitical to political, but instead indicates how humanitarianism 
has evolved in the last one hundred years. Intervention in the affairs of other states does 
not represent the break down of national sovereignty nor does it represent the 
globalization of a human rights regime. Absolute state sovereignty never truly existed 
and human rights interventions focus on the state as the main reason to intervene. In non-
UN interventions it is nation states intervening on the behalf of populations who no 
longer have the protection of their own state and UN interventions are in the name of the 
nation-states that make up the UN and reflect the goals and intentions of these states. 
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 Military humanitarian intervention has normalized the use of force in the name of 
human rights and humanitarianism. The justifications for the use of military and security 
mechanisms has been formalized and adopted by humanitarian organizations as human 
rights violations have become synonymous with security threats. Humanitarian 
organizations, backed by nation states are deployed to eliminate threats in conflict-ridden 
areas, once defined as states in the midst of war, though the definition is now being 
expanded to include countries that have been affected by natural disasters. In the 
following section, I will first outline of the history of Haiti and international intervention 
in Haiti, and end with the beginning of an analysis on the humanitarian response to the 
earthquake in 2010.  
Haiti’s History of Intervention  
No history of Haiti would be complete without attention to the implications of 
intervention (humanitarian or otherwise). For the purposes of this thesis I will focus 
mostly on the history of foreign intervention in Haiti. This section will provide both a 
historical context to the response to the Haitian earthquake as well as an historical 
overview of the relationship between Haiti and the international community. 
Understanding how the international community responded to the 2010 Haiti earthquake 
does not require a linear historical explanation, where we can explain the earthquake and 
its response by placing blame on a particular actors or historical events. For example, 
colonialism is not the sole cause of Haiti’s inability to cope with natural disasters.  
Instead, I hope to explore how the representations of Haiti both historically and currently 
reflect and influence the international community’s understanding of and relationship 
with Haiti and its people.  
 26 
Dominant narratives of the history of Haiti begin with the first foreign 
interventions in the 15th century (Garrigus 2006, Bellegarde-Smith 1990). Starting with 
the first traces of colonialism in the 17th century I will discuss each era of intervention in 
Haiti’s history, showing that although the methods, representations, and justifications for 
intervention may have changed, Haiti has experienced near-constant intervention by 
outside powers. Its viability as an independent country has always been questioned, and 
while the term “failed state” has only been applied relatively recently, Haiti has long been 
treated as a state incapable of providing for its citizens.  
Representations of the Haitian people and Haiti as a state have remained relatively 
unchanged in content. Haiti was the first black republic, achieving independence in 1804. 
From its inception it was seen as a threat to other slave-owning nations (Bellegarde-
Smith 1990), especially the United States. Fears that the Haitian rebellion would spread 
to the United States struck a chord with white politicians and slave owners. Haiti was 
seen as a threat to international stability and to the wealth generated by owning slaves 
(Langley 1996).  The first hundred years of the Haitian republic were marked by 
violence, instability, and deadly revolutions and the world continued to fear that the 
Haitian unrest and instability would spread. The Haitian people were seen as barbarians, 
and as voodoo practicing, illiterate peasants. Outsiders described Haitians’ revolutions 
and coups d’état as angry Haitian mobs wielding sabers (Girard 2005).  The foreign 
intervention in Haiti from colonialism, to the 150 million francs in debt owed to France 
(Bellegarde-Smith 1990), to the embargos, and to full blown United States intervention in 
the early 1900s (Schmidt 1995) and then again in the 1990s (Zanotti 2008) was and 
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continues to be justified by the portrayal of Haitians as unable to rule themselves, as 
threats to international stability, as threats to themselves and to those intervening.  
Haiti is located in the Caribbean on the island of Hispaniola. Haiti borders the 
Dominican Republic in the west. See map below.  
 
(source: http://www.worldmapnow.com/haiti-map.html) 
 
Colonialism 
 Colonialism is an overt and obvious form of intervention and for hundreds of 
years, Haiti has been influenced and affected by foreign intervention. During colonialism, 
the French controlled almost all aspects of statecraft (Girard 2005). The economy was 
export oriented and the vast majority of the population was of African descent, brought to 
the country by the slave trade (Bellegard-Smith 1990).  
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The colonization of the island of Hispaniola began in 1492, when Christopher 
Columbus claimed the island for Spain. The native population of Hispaniola, the Tainos, 
was quickly decimated by both European diseases and enslavement by the Spanish. By 
the 1600s most inhabitants of Hispaniola were predominately African slaves and their 
decedents. By the mid 1600s, one third of the island was given to France and in 1664 the 
French West India Company took control. Over the next two hundred years, the western 
area of Hispaniola, then called Saint-Domingue, became one of the most prosperous 
colonies in the new world, exporting vast amounts of sugar, coffee, cotton and Indigo. 
(Girard 2005). The number of African slaves far outnumbered the white European 
settlers, and due to the frequent taking of slave women as concubines, a new class was 
created, the mulattoes. Called the “free colored population” (Garrigus 2006: 4), they were 
able to own property, unlike the lower class of African slaves. By the 1700s many of the 
“free colored” men had vast plantations and owned hundreds of slaves (Garrigus 2006).  
The evils of colonialism have long been explored in academic work (Bhabha 
1990, Said 1994, Fanon 2004, Spivak 2010) and an in-depth description is unnecessary. 
The inhabitants of Haiti, like many other post-colonial states, suffered immensely from 
the colonial system and the effects of colonialism are still felt today. There are a few 
major points that are necessary for this thesis to discuss concerning Haiti and its colonial 
history. First, colonialism completely changed the island of Hispaniola. Not only did 
colonialism change the economy of Haiti to an export oriented satellite of France, but 
also it changed the way society was organized. The large slave population was not native 
to the area and was kept in subordination to the much smaller white population. 
Colonialism restructured society into an extremely hierarchal system where the elites 
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controlled not only the natural resources, economy, and the government, but they also 
controlled the vast majority of the population, first as slaves, then after the revolution as 
laborers. As Langley (1996) writes, “With its forty thousand whites, thirty thousand free 
coloreds, and five hundred thousand African slaves, the colony possessed the tiered social 
structure ordinarily found in sugar plantation economies” (106).  
Second, colonialism has had a lasting effect on how the international community 
perceives Haiti. Despite, or likely because of the revolution, Haiti has been perceived as a 
threat to the international community. The treatment of Haiti and Haitians by the 
international community has always been affected by this perception. There always exists 
a duality in the treatment of Haiti. On one hand Haitians are perceived as threatening; 
they are violent, mob like, devil worshipping, corrupt and militaristic. On the other hand, 
they are pitiful, voiceless and depraved. Haiti and Haitians are both feared and pitied in 
the same breath. I will discuss the representations of the Haitian state and its people in 
chapter three, but it is important to note that this representation is related to colonialism, 
racism, and the role of the international community in Haiti. 
The Haitian Revolution 
Understanding the Haitian revolution requires understanding the global political context 
at the time. The American Revolution ended in 1783 and the French revolution ended in 
the 1799. A civil war in Haiti broke out in 1790 following the onset of the French 
revolution, as both white and mulatto slave owners considered the implications of the 
new French laws would have on the colony. The revolution began a year later, after the 
mulatto claims for civil and political rights were denied. However, within a year the 
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French had aligned with the mulatto class against the slaves, temporarily pausing the war. 
The wars and revolutions in Europe gave the Haitian slaves a second chance the 
following year.  As Philippe Girard argues,  
Events in faraway Europe gave the slaves a second opportunity to free 
themselves. In 1793, the French revolution took a more radical turn- a tribunal 
sent Louis XVI to the guillotine, and all the conservative monarchies of Europe 
declared war on France. For the slaves, general war meant two things. First, 
France’s multifront war would leave few troops available for colonial duty should 
a new uprising erupt. Second the revolution’s leftist turn brought to the fore 
politicians sincerely dedicated to freedom and the equality of man (2005: 38). 
As the war went on in Europe, British and Spanish troops arrived in Saint Dominque in 
hopes of taking the island for their own colonial interests. The Haitian revolt, under the 
General Toussaint Louverture defeated the British and Spanish troops. In 1793, France 
abolished slavery in an attempt to stabilize the country. By 1801 Louverture was in 
charge of the entire island of Hispaniola. Napoleon Bonaparte, hoping to reinstitute 
slavery, sent troops in 1801 to reclaim the island. The French were victorious initially, 
and Louverture was exiled in 1802. Yet the war swung back in favor of the Haitians in 
1803 because of a series of setbacks to France. France went back to war with England, 
the French troops in Haiti died rapidly of yellow fever, and the British and American 
troops came to the aid of Haitian revolutionaries. In November 1803 it became clear that 
the French would not win the war. In 1804, Haiti became the first black republic, and the 
second country in the hemisphere to break away from its colonial powers. 
 Interestingly, the Haitian revolution was beneficial to the United States as well. 
Haiti was one of the few countries the young United States could trade with, and its 
defeat of France helped the United States gain the Louisiana territory. Many colonial 
powers, not just France, had a vested interest in Haiti during the years of revolution. On 
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one hand, the British and Spanish wanted France to lose its grip on Saint Dominque 
because its loss would aid them in their wars with France. On the other hand, European 
colonial powers feared the slave revolts would spread to their own Caribbean colonies. 
The Haitian revolution was a complex historical event. Each of the parties involved were 
in a constant state of flux and loyalties changed frequently. Sometimes the Haitian slaves 
fought beside the French, British or Spanish troops, sometimes they fought against them. 
Ultimately at the end of the revolution, the general mood was one of great distrust of 
Europeans and Americans. In the new black republic, the constitution stated that white 
people were unable to own property and land, and the systematic violence that was so 
rampant during colonialism and the long revolution was perpetuated against white settlers 
still residing in the country (Bellegarde-Smith 1990).  
Post Revolution Haiti 
“The Existence of Negro people in arms, occupying a country it has soiled by the most criminal acts, is a 
horrible spectacle for all white nations.” 
French foreign Minister Prince Charles Talleyrand calling for the United States to embargo Haiti       
(Lupin 1968). 
The years following the Haitian revolution were marked by instability both abroad and at 
home. Few countries accepted Haiti’s legitimacy immediately and many European 
countries and the United States placed trade embargos on the fledgling state. France only 
recognized Haiti in 1825 after Haitian President Jean Pierre Boyer agreed to pay 150 
million Francs to France for the latter’s loss of property (Bellegarde-Smith 1990).  The 
sum was later reduced to 60 million, but it took almost 100 years for Haiti to repay the 
debt (Bellegarde-Smith 1990). The Haitian customhouses were the “sole source of 
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revenue and, until 1915 [the year of the United States occupation], serviced the foreign 
debt to the tune of 80 percent, leaving 20 percent of revenues for all other state 
expenditures” (Bellegarde-Smith 1990: 73). The final payment for the debt to France was 
made in 1922 (Bellegarde-Smith). 
 Due to pressures from the United States government, Haiti was not allowed to 
attend the first Inter-American Panama Congress in 1826. The United States did not 
recognize Haiti until 1862, nearly 60 years after the end of the Haitian revolution, when 
United States President Abraham Lincoln abolished slavery. From the onset of Haiti’s 
establishment as a republic, the international community ostracized it, though it must be 
noted, still traded with it. Fear that the unrest and slave revolts would migrate to 
neighboring countries, and a general and widespread racism against the “black menace” 
(Bellegard-Smith 1990: 52) led to mistrust of Haiti by many countries. Additionally, 
much like Liberia, Haiti became a destination point for black Americans. Around 6,000 
Americans of African descent went to Haiti under the Free Black Immigration act. Most 
either died or returned to the United States within a few years because of disease and heat 
exhaustion (Locket 1991). 
 The poor relationship with the international community and the large debt that 
Haiti owed to France helped to systematically change how Haitian society was structured 
as an early republic. The first is the creation of a militarized society. Fears that France or 
another colonial power could return led to an increase in the military capacity of Haiti. 
The new country focused heavily on creating a strong military to defend itself against 
both foreign invaders, but also against internal opposition groups (Bellegarde-Smith 
1990). This militarization likely contributed to the multiple violent coups d’état and 
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general political unrest. Opposition was met with a strong hand and generally responded 
with an equal display of aggression.  
 In addition to the militarization of the early Haitian republic, the lack of 
international recognition and the debt owed to France also led to the institution of an 
economic class system similar to slavery, which reinforced the already existing class 
distinctions. Joan Dayan explains how the militarization and class structures contributed 
to the underdevelopment of Haiti: 
It was Boyer’s Rural Code of Haiti … that most contributed to the legacy of 
militarism and compulsory labor that would continue to undermine Haitian 
democracy. This code of laws which figured containment as fundamental to the 
order of society reduced most Haitians, especially those who did not occupy 
positions of rank in the military or civil branches of the state, to essential slave 
status. A small fraction of Haiti’s population lived off the majority, collecting fees 
– with the help of the rural chefs de section- for the sale travel, and butchering of 
animals, and even for the cutting of trees (2004: 6) 
Dayan later goes on to quote Louis-Joseph Janvier as saying the code in Haiti was 
“slavery without the whip” (2004: 6).  
 The international community’s refusal to recognize Haiti and the overt racism in 
their policies toward the country, the militarization of Haitian society, the constant coups 
d’état, the reinforcement of colonial-style class distinctions, and the insistence on an 
export-oriented economy to pay back France’s 60 million Franc debt all contributed to 
the impoverishment of the majority of Haitian civilians and the destabilization of the 
Haitian state and economy.  
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United States Intervention and Occupation (1915-1934) 
“Dear me, think of it! Niggers speaking French!” 
Oft quoted statement by U.S. Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan in 1914 (Allen 1930) 
The first United States occupation of Haiti officially began following the assassination of 
Haitian President Vilbrun Guillaume Sam on July 27, 1915. The United States Marines 
were already docked at Haitian ports prior to his assassination, and letters from as early 
as 1914 had been written to the Haitian government from the United States detailing the 
United States intentions, and suggesting the United States occupation had been in the 
works for at least two years (Schmidt 1995). The Haitians had seen almost every single 
one of their leaders assassinated or deposed in the hundred years since independence. 
Why did the United States choose 1915 to occupy Haiti? The intervention came at a time 
when the United States was gearing up to join World War One. Its main enemy was 
Germany, and there were many German businessmen who lived in Haiti (Schmidt 1995). 
American politicians were interested in securing the Caribbean against the spread of the 
European war into Haiti. Other Caribbean nations, like Cuba, Panama, the Dominican 
Republic, and Puerto Rico had already witnessed American occupations. Additionally, 
the economic, political and military power of the United States was being consolidated. 
Prior to World War I the United States was on the cusp of being one of the wealthiest and 
most powerful countries in the world (Schmidt 1995). In order to cement this power, the 
United States needed to have a strong hold in the Caribbean, both politically and 
economically. 
 Though many politicians were frank about the need to open up Haiti to foreign 
investments through occupation, there was also the underlying glow of a civilizing 
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mission. United States President Woodrow Wilson’s desire to make the world safe for 
democracy was often used to justify and encourage the occupation. Wilson’s, 
frequent insistence that the United States had a moral responsibility to promote 
constitutional democratic government in the Caribbean area... the belief that 
Haitians were inherently inferior, coupled with the dictates of state department 
diplomacy in the Caribbean, led to grotesque perversion of the declared 
missionary ideal of spreading liberal democracy. Indeed, the occupation, in the 
process of exercising unwelcome foreign military domination, consistently 
suppressed local democratic institutions and denied elementary political liberties. 
Wilson”s obsession with order, stability and constitutionalism, implying 
government by law and the sanctity of legal contracts, was translated into rigid 
authoritarianism based on the assertion that Haitians were incapable of self-
government (Schmidt 1995: 10) 
This civilizing mission also included “modernizing” the country and its people. 
Modernizing Haiti meant building roads, developing agribusiness, and educating the 
upper middle class. All three proved difficult, and in the end only the first two were 
successful. Building roads and railroads was accomplished by reinstating the Corvée, a 
law from the mid 1800s that required that Haitians either pay a tax or be forced to build 
roads through mandatory labor (Schmidt 1995). As most Haitians were unable to pay the 
taxes, they were conscripted into forced labor. The roads were built, but the cruel 
enforcement echoed Haiti’s legacy of slavery. The second modernization project, 
developing agribusiness, required a change in the Haitian constitution to allow white 
foreigners to own land. With American military pressures, a new constitution was passed 
in 1918 allowing foreigners to own property (Schmidt 1995). The roads and the new 
constitution each stood to consolidate the American power over Haiti and opened Haiti 
up for American economic interests. The education program failed due to a lack of 
participation and interest by the Haitians chosen for the education loans. 
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 Most Haitians were displeased with the United States occupation. Both peasants 
and middle class Haitians began revolting. This began the Caco Wars of liberation, which 
lasted from 1915 to 1934.  The United States called the wars “guerilla wars,” a term 
which signifies a lack of clarity regarding who is partaking in the revolt and who is a 
civilian. The Caco Wars were frequently met with Marine brutality, but continued for 
most of the occupation (Schmidt 1995). As a result, the United States Marines began 
training the Haitian military to help control and stabilize the country. The control and 
strength of the Haitian military would reach its peak during the Duvalier years and would 
only be halted in the 1990s by UN and NATO peacekeeping troops when the Haitian 
military was dismantled (Zanotti 2008). The United States Marine violence was not only 
accepted by United States politicians but also lauded. In November of 1915, United 
States forces killed every Haitian soldier during a battle at Fort Riviere. The General who 
oversaw the slaughter received the Congressional Medal of Honor. During the United 
States occupation, fifteen percent of Haiti’s two million population fled to the Dominican 
Republic or Cuba3.  
Although the United States officially left in 1934, its presence has been felt in 
Haiti ever since, whether through international aid, humanitarian organizations, support 
of presidents, or more military troops. The two countries also remain connected by the 
large Haitian Diaspora residing in the United States, on whose remittances many Haitians 
survive.  
                                                         
3 Compare this number with the recent U.S. occupation in Iraq. According to most censes the war has 
caused around 7% of the Iraqi population to flee Iraq to neighboring countries. 
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The Duvalier Years: Papa and Baby Doc 
“I know the Haitian people because I am the Haitian people.” 
 Infamous Quote by Haitian President Francois Duvalier 
The Duvalier dictatorship that began with the election of Francois Duvalier (Papa 
Doc) in 1957 and ended with the removal of his son, Jean-Claude Duvalier (Baby Doc), 
in 1986 marks a particularly violent and disturbing period in Haiti’s history. Although the 
country was traditionally run by dictators, loosely defined as those not democratically 
elected and whose base of power is limited to an oligarchy supported by the military, the 
Duvalier years still stand out as particularly repressive. However, as with the other 
sections in the historical examination of Haiti, I will attempt to stress that the context and 
backdrop of Papa and Baby Doc’s twenty-nine-year reign is almost as important as the 
brutality and force they used to maintain power.  
 In this section, I will not go into great detail concerning the means by which the 
Duvalier regime maintained power domestically. For this I recommend Haiti, State 
Against Nation: The Origins and Legacy of Duvalierism by Michel Rolph Trouillot 
(1990) and Papa Doc: Haiti and Its Dictator by Bernard Diederich and Al Burt (1990) 
and instead will discuss how international involvement helped create the conditions that 
enabled them to take and hold on to power. In no way do I believe or support a theory 
that the international community created the Duvalier dictatorships. Instead, I hope to 
shed light on the roles various actors played ad suggest that if we wish to understand the 
brutality of the dictatorship, we cannot look at it through an ahistorical lens.  
 Prior to Francois Duvalier’s election Haiti was experiencing relative stability. The 
lack of political upheaval and the increase in foreign aid money gave the appearance that 
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Haiti was improving. However, a growing economic crisis was facing the country. 
Agriculture represented eighty seven percent of the GNP, yet environmental degradation 
and overpopulation in rural areas was increasing, leading to a subsequent increase in 
migration to Port Au Prince (Trouillot 1990). An economy based on export-oriented 
agriculture is particularly sensitive to both the international economy and the effects of 
nature. Severe droughts, coupled with floods and hurricanes frequently disrupt the 
production of agricultural goods, while international instability can affect the price 
market. The massive migrations to Port Au Prince not only further impoverished the 
urban areas, it also paved the way for Duvalier to later increase manufacturing as a major 
industry.  
 When Duvalier was “elected” he was, according to some an unassuming and 
“stupid” man (Trouillot 1990). This perception helped him win supporters in the military 
who thought he could be easily manipulated. A rural doctor, who was not a mulatto, did 
have a base of support. Few could have guessed he would later go on to kill between 
twenty and fifty thousand Haitians, force one fifth of the population to flee the country, 
and routinely beat and imprison anyone who was seen as a threat to his power (Trouillot 
1990). His power was consolidated by his use of both the military and the Volunteers for 
National Security, popularly known as the Tontons Macoutes. The military was, as 
previously mentioned, created and trained by the United States Marines who continued to 
support it during the Duvalier reign. (Schmidt 1995).  
The United States also supported the Duvalier regime with international aid, an 
example of the previously discussed influence of Cold War politics. Cold War tensions 
led to the United States supporting dictatorships over Communist governments, and Papa 
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Doc manipulated this doctrine to maintain United States and United Nations support. The 
United States,  
provided $7 million in economic aid to the Duvalier government between 
February and September 1959 and almost $11 million in 1960. U.S. aid amounted 
to $13.5 million, almost 50 percent of the Haitian national budget, in 1961 alone, 
and from 1957 to 1986, U.S. aid to the Duvalier regime may have amounted to as 
much as $900 million. As late as 1983, 40 percent of the Haitian government’s 
budget and 60 percent of its development funds came from Western governments, 
including $54 million from the United States. Thus the Duvalier regime could ill 
afford to alienate its foreign benefactors in major areas affecting their economic 
interests. (Bellegard-Smith 1990: 100).  
The Duvalier regime is a dark time in Haiti’s history. We cannot, however, see it as an 
exceptional or isolated event, for it was able to emerge in the context of Haiti’s past, both 
domestic and international and the geopolitical realities of the Cold War period. We can 
not only think of Papa and Baby Doc as cruel megalomaniacs, but must also understand 
that their rise to and consolidation of power is rooted in the history of a country that has 
long been plagued by both internal political upheaval and external intervention.  
Aristide 
 Following Baby Doc’s ousting, power struggles resumed. New leaders followed 
much the same path as those who came before them, and none lasted very long as 
political coups replaced one dictator with another. As the political elite grabbed at power, 
a priest by the name of Jean-Bertrand Aristide was preaching in the streets against the 
Duvalierists, and then later their successors. Aristide, who was president three separate 
times (first in 1991, from 1994- 1996, and then 2001-2004), is an enigmatic character in 
Haiti’s long history of leaders. There are multiple books and articles written about the ex-
president and they generally fall into one of two camps: Aristide as the savior or Aristide 
as the despot (Horton and Summerskill 2007). Although I will not engage fully in an 
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exploration of the two arguments, it is striking how clearly the lines are drawn. I will 
attempt to focus on the international involvement in the election, coups against and 
returns of President Aristide instead of attempting to evaluate his personality or purposes. 
In 1990 Aristide was “democratically elected” which can be defined in this case as 
receiving 67 percent of the popular vote and the fact that the elections were monitored by 
the OAS, the UN, and the Carter Center, which as Zartman argues, “contributed to their 
fairness and to the subsequent sense of responsibility and engagement of the international 
organizations as well” (Zartman 2005: 183). Aristide was overthrown in a military coup 
just eight months later. The military junta ruled from September 1991 to September of 
1994, and was unofficially led by Army General Raoul Cedras, with Joseph Nerrete 
serving as the official president. Emmanuel Constant, was the founder of the Front for the 
Advancement and Progress of Haiti (FRAPH) party, which was created to eliminate 
Aristide supporters. Constant was on the C.I.A. pay roll for a number of years, providing 
essential information about the political elites in Haiti (Girard 2004). 
The international community, specifically the Organization of American States 
(OAS) decided to take action on this “assault on democracy” by first enacting an 
unsuccessful trade embargo (Girard 2004). The initial embargo was limited to weapons 
and oil, but was later expanded to include most things that were not humanitarian in 
nature. The embargo did not encourage the military junta to step down, but did hurt poor 
Haitians and further widened the gap between the rich and the poor. Following the 
unsuccessful embargo, the United States, with the support of the United Nations, set in 
motion a military intervention that would overthrow the junta and reinstate the 
democratically elected Aristide.  
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Although “restoring democracy” and protecting human rights were largely cited 
as the reasons for the 1994 occupation, it is relatively clear that there were multiple 
reasons for President Bill Clinton’s decision to intervene. The United States had just 
recently led a disastrous mission in Somalia, and though at first hesitant to make the same 
mistake twice, the administration did want to preserve the United States” post-Cold War 
reputation as a super power (Girard 2004). The United States was also, at least nominally, 
concerned about drug trafficking. President Clinton was also concerned about the support 
of the Congressional Black Caucus and other influential Aristide supporters. Finally, the 
United States was deeply concerned with illegal immigration (Girard 2004). Fear of the 
Haitian migration is arguably one of the major reasons the United States ultimately 
decided to intervene. Unwilling to accept the Haitian immigrants, but also unwilling to 
support the junta, the American government was in a difficult position as to how to deal 
with the “boat people.” As Major Kent Simon writes in Two Strikes: American 
Intervention in Haiti, “The immigration and humanitarian crises created by the Haitian 
military certainly pulled at the heartstrings of American society” (Kent 2002: 44). In his 
speech prior to the invasion, Clinton stated the following, 
Just four years ago the Haitian people held the first free and fair elections since 
their independence… But eight months later, Haitian dreams of democracy 
became a nightmare of bloodshed… No American should be surprised that the 
recent tide of migrants seeking refuge on our shores comes from Haiti and Cuba. 
After all, they are the only nations left in the Western Hemisphere where 
democratic government is denied; the only countries where dictators have 
managed to hold back the wave of democracy that has swept our entire region, 
and that our government has so actively promoted and supported for years… 
History has taught us that preserving democracy in our own hemisphere 
strengthens America’s security and prosperity… May God bless the people the 
United States and the cause of freedom (Clinton 1994). 
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It would be politically incorrect to directly admit that one of the major reasons for going 
to war is to prevent immigration, but it is still apparent in the speeches and policies that 
preventing more illegal immigration and avoiding giving refugee status to the perhaps 
hundreds of thousands of Haitians played a large part in the final decision to intervene. 
As Major Kent’s quote earlier suggests, immigration pulls at the heartstrings of American 
society. The situation of intervening to avoid illegal immigration was mirrored again 
following the 2004 Haitian uprising, and again after the 2010 earthquake.  
 In the short term, the 1994 intervention was largely considered successful. The 
“peacekeeping operation” was able to end the military rule and reinstated Aristide as 
president. The long-term results, however, are dubious. The long-term goal of sustaining 
peace and state building proved insufficient, as four years after Aristide was elected a 
second time, he was overthrown in another rebellion. Throughout the 1990s the UN, 
OAS, and the United States played a major role in training a new police force. The 
Haitian military, long seen as a major factor in the country’s violence and record of 
human rights violations, was systematically dismantled. Soldiers were trained to become 
police officers and the judicial system was changed to a “Western” model of rule of law 
(Zanotti 2004). 
The 2004 Uprising and the creation of MINUSTAH  
 After the reinstatement of Aristide in 1994, the UN and other multinational forces 
maintained a steady involvement in Haiti. The first peacekeeping operation, United 
Nations Mission in Haiti (UNWIH) was established in 1993 and in 1994 the Security 
Council authorized a multinational police force to “maintain a secure and stable 
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environment in the country, and promote the rule of law” (United Nations MINUSTAH 
2011). Due to wavering support of members in the UN Security Council, the 
peacekeeping troops rarely reached the full-intended capacity and Haiti saw over five 
different “peacekeeping missions” from 1994-2004.  
 In June of 1995 Aristide’s party, Lavalas (“flood” in Creole), won a sweeping 
reelection victory. Rene Preval, a political ally of Aristide, was elected president. In 
1996, however, Aristide broke his alliance with Preval and started the Lavalas Family 
party. The break caused a deadlock in Haiti’s politics until the 2000 elections when 
Aristide was reelected. According to the UN, the “instability” in Haiti waxed and waned 
during these years. Aristide was, at times, viewed as being cooperative and willing to 
compromise with the international community and Haitian political elites, and at other 
times as being a problem for the UN and its peacekeeping missions in Haiti (Einsiedel 
and Malone 2006). Sebastian Einsiedel and David Malone suggest, “The UN’s efforts 
were severely undermined by Aristide, who turned out to be an increasingly unhelpful 
and unreliable partner, and by other Haitian political actors” (2006: 160). 
 The goals and mandates of the peacekeeping missions in Haiti prior to the 
peacekeeping mission MINUSTAH were broad and according to Einsidel and Malone, 
failed for two reasons: An insufficient amount of funds and military personnel, and a 
failure of the Haitian government to cooperate with the peacekeeping forces and the UN 
state-building goals (Einsiedel and Malone 2006). This line of thinking influenced how 
the UN and the international community structured the formation of MINUSTAH 
following the uprising in 2004, when Aristide was ousted. When MINUSTAH was 
formed in April 2004, it was given more power and more personnel than the previous 
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peacekeeping missions. MINUSTAH’s mandate was also more refined and specific than 
Multinational Interim Force, one of MINUSTAH’s predecessors, or the other missions. 
According to the MINUSTAH website,  
MINUSTAH was originally set up to support the Transitional Government in 
ensuring a secure and stable environment; to assist in monitoring, restructuring 
and reforming the Haitian National Police; to help with comprehensive and 
sustainable Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programmes; 
to assist with the restoration and maintenance of the rule of law, public safety and 
public order in Haiti; to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations 
and equipment and to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical 
violence; to support the constitutional and political processes; to assist in 
organizing, monitoring, and carrying out free and fair municipal, parliamentary 
and presidential elections; to support the Transitional Government as well as 
Haitian human rights institutions and groups in their efforts to promote and 
protect human rights; and to monitor and report on the human rights situation in 
the country (United Nations MINUSTAH 2011). 
MINUSTAH’s mandate, originally conceived to be a short-term mission, has been 
renewed since 2004 and was renewed again following the earthquake of 2010. 
MINUSTAH has also changed and evolved according to the current political situation in 
Haiti (United Nations MINUSTAH 2011). The widening of the goals allowed for both 
MINUSTAH and the UN to have a greater level of control over Haitian politics and the 
population. MINUSTAH is the main police force in Haiti and is in charge of training the 
Haitian National Police.  
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The International Response to the 2010 Earthquake in Haiti  
On Tuesday January 24, 2010, an earthquake with a magnitude of 7.0 Mw hit Haiti at 
approximately 16:53. See map below of the epicenter of the earthquake in Haiti.  
 
(Source U.S. Geological Survey 2010) 
As of February 12, 2010 the following statistics had been released: Three million 
people were affected by the earthquake; between 217,000 and 230,000 people were dead 
and 300,000 injured; 1.5 million people had been left homeless and internally displaced, 
about one sixth of the Haitian population (United Nations OCHA 2010)4.  
One year later, the Interim Haiti Reconstruction Commission (IHRC) suggests 
that one million people still reside in IDP camps across Haiti and less than five percent of 
IDPs have access to potable water and only twenty seven percent have access to                                                         
4 These are estimates by the UN and Haitian government. The true number of dead, injured and displaced 
will never be known because of the inability to take accurate censes directly following the earthquake.  
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sanitation. The humanitarian response proved difficult on multiple levels. Not only were 
the Haitian government, domestic and international NGOs and other international actors 
unprepared for a disaster of this scale, but the earthquake destroyed roads, government 
and NGO buildings and killed a large number of people, both Haitians and foreigners 
who had previously worked in the public sector. Areas outside of Port Au Prince often 
did not receive emergency aid and assistance until days or weeks after the earthquake 
because few humanitarian actors could make it out of the capital.  
One could spend an entire thesis detailing the international response to Haiti. 
Hundreds of people and aid agencies were deployed to respond, and billions of dollars in 
aid have been pledged. It would be difficult to describe how each organization 
participated in the disaster assistance and recovery, so I will highlight instead how 
MINUSTAH, the UN’s World Food Program (WFP), the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) and the United States military responded in the months following the 
earthquake. What follows is in no way a monolithic description of how all aid 
organizations and international governments responded. 
MINUSTAH, as discussed earlier, was deployed in response to the 2004 coup 
d’état that overthrew the Aristide government. Due to political instability, the mandate of 
MINUSTAH has been renewed annually. After the 2010 earthquake, the mandate was 
again renewed and additional troops were sent (United Nations MINUSTAH 2011). 
MINUSTAH is mandated to ensure political stability and is to “support of the 
Transitional Government, to ensure a secure and stable environment within which the 
constitutional and political process in Haiti can take place” (United Nations Resolution 
1542). Major Bruce Sand, a member of MINUSTAH from Canada wrote, “MINUSTAH 
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is the world’s effort to coach Haiti back onto the path of national stability and heading 
toward peace and prosperity” (National Defense and Canadian Forces 2010). In a speech 
after the passage of the resolution to send more troops to Haiti following the earthquake, 
Secretary-General of the United Nations Ban Ki-moon argued, “We must do all we can to 
get these extra forces on the ground as soon as possible so that they can help maintain 
order and deliver humanitarian assistance.” (United Nations Press Release 2010) 
MINUSTAH’s main role in the response to the earthquake has been to “maintain order” 
by securitizing the distribution of aid. It has been operating as a national policing force 
for the protection of aid workers and securitizing the distribution centers and the 
distribution process to safeguard against rioting and violence (United Nations 
MINUSTAH press release 2010). 
The United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) was also already operating 
in Haiti prior to January 2010, but dramatically scaled up its response in the first week 
after the earthquake. Within 24 hours, WFP was distributing emergency food packets. 
According to its website, WFP distributed food to over four million displaced Haitians 
(Haiti -World Food Program 2010). WFP set up at least 50 distribution centers in Port Au 
Prince and surrounding areas (WFP 2010). After the “emergency” stage was completed, 
the organization slowly switched to the “recovery” stage, in which they ended blanket 
(untargeted) mass distributions and began distributing aid to “vulnerable groups” (WFP 
Haiti: One Year Later report 2011). In the recovery stage, WFP is focusing its 
distributions on school children, the elderly, the disabled, pregnant women and single 
mothers. In the “Haiti: One Year After” report, the organization states that it is now 
attempting to coordinate more with the Haitian government to purchase foods grown 
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locally, and to streamline their services with the needs of the government. Additionally, 
the organization details its coordination with other humanitarian organizations, for 
example CARE, World Vision, and the Red Cross Red Crescent societies, as well as 
MINUSTAH and the United States army which provided security for the organization 
during some of the food distributions (WFP Haiti: One Year Later report 2011). 
The International Organization of Migration (IOM) was also operational in 
Haiti prior to the earthquake, but its focus was largely on monitoring international 
migration patterns. After the earthquake, it began focusing on the internally displaced 
populations as well. The IOM fact sheet states that, 
Under the overall leadership of the Government of Haiti, IOM is working closely 
with many other humanitarian and development organizations, including the UN 
country team, to ensure safe living locations and adequate shelter, as well as 
tracking population movements and informing on conditions at displacement sites 
(IOM Haiti Fact Sheet 2010).  
 
IOM is in charge of the Camp Manager Cluster (CCIM), which trains and coordinates 
camp managers. It is also active in the Health, Shelter, and Sanitation clusters. Its main 
role in the response has been to help NGOs coordinate and collaborate, and to conduct 
data collection and monitor IDP campsites. The IOM is the largest international 
organization operating in Haiti, employing over four hundred people (IOM Haiti 2011). 
 The United States military, under the Operation Unified Response, deployed 
22,000 forces in the months following the earthquake. Most of the military units were 
aboard ships in the waters surrounding Haiti, but some seven thousand were based on 
land (SOUTHCOM 2010). The units are under the control of Southern Command, or 
SOUTHCOM, which is in charge of the United States military operations in South 
America and the Caribbean. The military was deployed the day after the earthquake hit. 
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The Department of Defense describes the mission as one intended “to save lives and 
provide security, when necessary, to support the delivery of water, food and medical 
care” (Department of Defense 2010). According to United States Marines interviewed in 
the summer of 2010, the United States military was unable to directly give aid to 
Haitians, but instead acted to support international humanitarian organizations. One 
serviceman I spoke to suggested that the military had stopped giving direct aid so that the 
United States military would not give the wrong impression about the role of the military. 
In the same vein a Time magazine article presented the mission as follows: 
The “Marines are definitely warriors first,” Captain Clark Carpenter said Friday 
as his unit prepared to ship out to Haiti from North Carolina. “But we are equally 
as compassionate when we need to be, and this is a role that we like to show — a 
compassionate warrior that can reach out that helping hand to those who need it” 
(Time Magazine 2010).  
 
Why did the United States military and the UN peacekeeping troops play such an 
enormous role in the distribution of aid following the earthquake? I recognize the 
dominant arguments that only a military operation (the United States military and the 
already active peacekeeping mission in Haiti) has the logistical training and access to 
resources to adequately respond, but ultimately I believe there is a more complicated 
answer, which is tied to how humanitarianism is changing in response to a global 
pressures and agendas. As societies become increasingly concerned with issues of 
security, the mechanisms and functions of humanitarianism are changing to respond. An 
analysis of the discourses of the media, humanitarian organizations, governments, the 
UN, peacekeeping troops and the United States military illuminates a shift toward 
humanitarianism operating as a mechanism of security. This chapter has illustrated how 
humanitarianism has evolved in light of the changing relationships between 
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humanitarianism and other discourses (developmentalism, human rights etc.) as well as 
the changing representations of humanitarianism, and humanitarian organizations and the 
internally displaced populations they are serving.  
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Chapter Two: Humanitarianism as a Mechanism of Security 
The previous chapter first explored changes and evolutions in understandings of 
humanitarianism as a form of intervention. In focusing on interventions in Haiti, the 
chapter examined not only how our perceptions of humanitarianism have changed 
historically, but also how humanitarianism can be understood as a means of intervention 
and how it fits among other forms of interventions in Haiti. This chapter will focus on 
humanitarianism as a mechanism of governmentality, and a reflection of global politics 
and sovereignty. As politicians, states and international organizations become 
increasingly concerned with issues of security, how does the humanitarian industry 
reflect these changes? In this chapter I argue that the humanitarian industry, operating as 
a mechanism of power, is currently grounded in discourses of security. Humanitarianism 
is intricately tied to the “international community” because of the distribution of power in 
society and the manner in which sovereignty has evolved due to global governance and 
globalization. The international community, represented by nation-states that desire to 
control and monitor populations is increasingly focusing on the construction and 
elimination of “security threats.” Humanitarianism is one mechanism that the 
international community deploys to create more secure communities, nations, and 
populations. This chapter will first outline how humanitarianism is a mechanism of 
governance and how this reflects the relationships between the international community, 
humanitarian organizations and the displaced populations they are serving. The chapter 
will then move toward understanding humanitarianism as means of securing and 
monitoring populations. With a focus on Haiti’s internally displaced population camps as 
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sites where the mechanisms of security are performed, the chapter will explore how 
humanitarianism as intervention is operating as a mechanism of security.  
Humanitarianism as a Mechanism of Governance 
Foucault (2007) begins his discussion about governmentality and power by defining 
power “in terms of the set of mechanisms and procedures that have a role or function and 
theme”(16). Humanitarianism is operating as a mechanism of governance because of the 
ways in which power is distributed, the organization and structure of humanitarian 
organizations, and humanitarian organizations’ relationship with the international 
community. Foucault argues, “mechanisms of power are an intrinsic part of all relations 
and, in a circular way, are both their effect and cause” (2007:17). Thus cannot examine 
humanitarianism as a mechanism of governance without conceptualizing it first as a 
mechanism of power. 
  In the second section of this chapter I will discuss humanitarianism and 
sovereignty, but in this section I will outline how humanitarianism is a mechanism of 
power and of governance. Foucault explores power as the relations and procedures 
“whose role is to establish, maintain, and transform mechanisms of power, are not “self-
generating” or “self- subsistent”; they are not founded on themselves.  Power is not 
founded on itself or generated by itself” (2007: 17). Humanitarianism is one of the 
mechanisms through which power is exercised. 
Although the intentionality and the stated aims and goals of humanitarian 
organizations might not suggest a direct tie with the political goals of the international 
community, there are a number of direct correlations between the two. To understand 
humanitarian organizations as mechanisms of governance, I will examine four aspects 
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that speak to not only their institutionalization and industrialization but also their 
connections to the international community.  
 Working from a broad, institutional level, humanitarian organizations are 
bureaucratized and are institutionally organized in much the same way corporations, 
government agencies, and the health care industry are organized. As organizations 
attempt to become more efficient and streamline services, they become increasingly 
bureaucratized. Humanitarian organizations, like corporations or government agencies, 
are organized in a top down manner. There is generally a CEO, or Executive Director at 
the top and power is distributed in a tiered manner down to the field workers. Each tier 
receives their orders from the tier above and is expected to not only obey those orders, 
but also enforce them on the tiers below. This method is considered to be the most 
efficient means of organization, partly because of how it distributes power. Each person 
has a certain amount of power, but also a certain amount of powerlessness, in that they 
have little control or means of opposing directives. Humanitarian workers even those 
who work in an office, are then, because of the institutional, bureaucratic structure of 
humanitarian organizations both explicitly enforced by and enforcing power. 
 This power distribution leads to humanitarian organizations becoming 
mechanisms of governance especially when one considers the funding and the directives 
that are enforced by funders. Nonprofit organizations, because of the manner in which 
they are structured and their almost constant battle for funds are dependent on funders. 
Funders are offered control in the operation of the organizations. This becomes 
problematic when the funding for many of the large scale humanitarian organizations, 
such UNHCR or the Red Cross, depends largely on governments, and more specifically, 
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the American government. This trend is on the rise, as Michael Barnett (2005) and 
Joanna Macrae (2001) discuss. Barnett, in Humanitarianism Transformed writes, 
“Although private contributions increased, they paled in comparison to official 
[government] assistance… A few donors were responsible for much of this increase, and 
they also now comprise an oligopoly. The United States is the lead donor by a factor of 
three” (Barnett 2005: 727). Funders are able to dictate policy changes and operational 
practices by either increasing or cutting funding. If the funder, be it a private individual, a 
corporation, or the United States government, does not agree with how a humanitarian 
organization is being run, they are able to tell the organization. If the contributions are 
large enough, the organization is likely to adjust their policies and programs. When 
power is distributed in a top down, bureaucratic way, it is easy to see how funders can 
affect the operations of humanitarian organizations, and in turn how the latter have 
limited space protesting or opposing the directives their funders.  
 Funding for the U.N. comes from individual member states’ dues and funding 
appeals for specific donations. However, the amount of dues corresponds to the size of 
GDP (United Nations 2010). Due to the vast economic inequalities between member 
states, the top 15 (out of 192) contributors give eighty four percent of the regular budget 
and eighty nine percent of the peacekeeping budget (United Nations 2010).  The top five 
contributors are the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China and the Russian 
Federation and they contribute close to forty percent of the budget. The five permanent 
members of the U.N. Security council, not surprisingly, are the United States, the United 
Kingdom, France, China and the Russian Federation.  
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According to the International Committee of Red Cross 2007 annual report, ICRC 
“is funded by contributions from the States party to the Geneva Conventions 
(governments); national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies; supranational 
organizations (such as the European Commission); and public and private sources. All 
funding is voluntary” (ICRC Annual Report 2007). The International Committee of Red 
Cross is also primarily funded by the United States and Western, European countries 
(ICRC Annual Report 2007). 
 Humanitarian organizations are mechanism of governance because of the nature 
and purpose of their work. Humanitarian organizations, whose funding, staff and 
directives are coming largely from the “developed” world and operating in the 
“developing” world, are offering humanitarian assistance to those countries which are 
deemed underdeveloped or in need of additional support. This assistance, despite its best 
intentions, is based on certain assumptions that the organizations, the people who work 
for them, and their funders have about who needs assistance, who is qualified to give it, 
and what assistance looks like. These assumptions are generally based on dominant 
narratives and perceptions about development and human rights, which rely on 
Enlightenment ideals of a modernization and the linear path to achieving development 
(Mohanty 2003, Barker 2000, Harding 2000). The modernization ideology is also based 
on dichotomies, which function to create distinct spheres that stand in opposition to each 
other. This allows for the differentiation between two things in stark contrast, which in 
turn simplifies issues and denies socio-historical and economic factors by reducing issues 
to “traditional versus modern,” “male versus female,” “black versus white,” or “North 
versus South.” Humanitarian assistance is, therefore, a mechanism of governance that 
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reflects and propagates notions of development and human rights across the globe. 
Humanitarian organizations are mechanisms of governance that, through a variety of 
methods, enforce and reinforce existing power structures and relationships. 
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) recently requested $103.3 
million for the UNDP of Haiti. The money, as discussed earlier, comes from the 
international community. Although the U.N. acknowledges, “only Haitians can rebuild 
Haiti again” (UNDP 2010: 2) they will still have a large part in the coordination of that 
rebuilding. As the UNDP itself states, 
The Haitian authorities are determined to build back a “new Haiti,” a Haiti 
transformed by seizing this historic moment and entering into a new partnership 
with the international community. The UN is committed to placing itself at the 
centre of this new partnership, which should rest on the principles of Haitian 
leadership and mutual accountability for results (UNDP 2010: 3 emphasis added).  
 
Much of the funding is going towards a cash-for-work program, which creates jobs for 
displaced Haitians. The UNDP, and by proxy its funders, the “international community,” 
are contributing greatly to the restructuring of the Haitian government and economy. The 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) states as its goal 
developing Haiti economically, politically, and socially. Its goals include helping Haiti 
reduce internal conflict and provide the basis to rebuild by addressing key sources 
of stress and conflict in social, economic and political spheres, notably through 
creating employment and rebuilding assets for sustainable livelihoods (economic), 
increasing access to primary health services and primary education (social), and 
fostering improved rule of law and responsive governance (political) (USAID 
Strategic Plan 2010). 
 
USAID and the United States government are operating under the assumption that they 
hold the key to improving the situation in Haiti. The model USAID employs in Haiti is 
the same model it uses in all “fragile states” and incorporates the ideals of economic 
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freedom, the rule of law, and democratically organized government. USAID has had the 
same goal of “developing Haiti” since its inception in the 1960s (USAID 2010).   
 Relationships of power are further evidenced in the increasing utilization of 
securitization discourses. Humanitarian organizations are operating as mechanisms of 
security through indirect means by controlling the distribution of food, water, and shelter. 
This level of control allows humanitarian organizations to practice biopower from at an 
international level. Humanitarian organizations, which are dependent on the whims of the 
international community, are able to control the most basic of human functions and 
therefore are able to monitor, supervise and control people at the level of the population. 
The discourses of securitization are also increasingly evident in more direct ways, 
through the militarization of humanitarianism and humanitarian intervention. Aid has 
become tied to issues of “security” in a number of ways. Two main examples are the use 
of humanitarianism to justify military intervention and the use of security and military 
forces and technologies to distribute aid. I will address these issues in greater detail later.  
 Finally, on the local level, humanitarianism is a mechanism of governance and is 
practicing power in its everyday, on the ground, interactions. The unequal power 
distribution between aid workers and recipients of aid is discussed in Barbara Harrell-
Bond’s seminal article, “Can Humanitarian Work with Refugees be Humane?” (2002). 
Harrell-Bond suggests that the very nature of giving and receiving aid is disempowering 
for refugees,  
There are insufficient resources to meet needs, with the power to decide their 
allocation placed in the hands of humanitarian workers who have no 
responsibility to consider the views of those for whom they are intended. As a 
consequence, both humanitarian workers and refugees are “trapped” in 
asymmetrical relationships in a structure in which accountability is skewed in the 
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direction of the donors who pay for the assistance rather than the refugees (2002: 
53).  
 
Though Harrell-Bond never mentions Foucault, this is clearly an example of how power 
is distributed at all levels of society and is exercised through different relationships. 
Humanitarian aid workers, because of their position as a “helper” as Harrell-Bond 
suggests, are inherently in a relative position of power over the refugees. This power can 
often be detrimental to both refugees and the helpers themselves. The power exercised by 
aid workers is relative in relation to funders in that they do not have the position or 
authority to make decisions about how organizations are run.  
 After the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, well-meaning aid workers descended on the 
country. Hundreds of organizations sent people to respond to the disaster. It was believed 
that Haiti alone would be unable to respond adequately, because of as discussed in the 
previous chapter, Haiti has long been represented as a failed or fragile state and its history 
of intervention and colonialism have helped create discourses about the inabilities and 
underdevelopment of the Haitian state. Aid workers came from around the world, with a 
variety of skills and vocations. Aid workers, with their ability to save or take lives by 
controlling the distribution of shelter, food, water, or medical treatment of the Haitian 
population who were displaced and affected by the earthquake. One volunteer from the 
organization World Vision described a trip to distribute tents and building materials on 
her blog, “Eileen’s Blog.” She and a veteran aid worker who has worked all over the 
world describe waking up one morning at 5:00 am to visit a camp and distribute tents: 
“The plan is to go early and make sure that only those who live in the camp get the help 
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they need,” wrote Eileen. Not only do aid workers have a monopoly on the distribution of 
aid (in this case tents) but they can, or must, determine who deserves and who does not.  
 At a shelter cluster meeting in Port Au Prince I heard a presentation from the 
representatives of Humanitarianism Accountability Partnership (HAP). HAP was 
conducting camp committee assessments to evaluate how camp committees shared 
information, and managed camp participation and complaint mechanisms. According to 
the representatives there were three levels of accountability: HAP, Interagency (the 
organizations managing the camps) and the camp committees. Their purpose was to 
assess participation and level of local ownership of the camp and its elected committees. 
HAP and the NGO camp managers were involved in restructuring the camp committees 
to change the power structures and encourage democratic participation. At one point in 
the presentation the speaker stated that part of HAP’s role in the shelter cluster was to 
“assess the camp committees to decide how much power to give them.” The presentation 
reveals the role and level of control of organizations like HAP and the UN have in the 
IDP camps: the humanitarian organizations have the ability to give power to Haitians if 
they behave in the way preferred by the international organizations.  
 Even though displaced Haitians have been placed in positions of relative 
powerlessness, they were still instances in which Haitians took matters into their own 
hands. Although humanitarian organizations claim to have the ability to give power, or to 
empower Haitians, in reality each day Haitians are empowering themselves. For example, 
when humanitarian organizations or the Haitian government fail to deliver essential 
services, or neglect particular camps because of their location or size, it is up to the 
community to deliver the services themselves. At one camp I visited, an international 
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humanitarian organization had ceased trash collection. Most sanitation operations are 
controlled by humanitarian organizations, so it was difficult for this camp to find an 
affordable option for garbage disposal. When the trash started to pile up, and no 
organization would agree to help, the camp decided to borrow pick-up trucks and used 
shovels to take the trash out. Even though international organizations control many of the 
essential service delivery sectors, when they fail to do so, members of the camps are 
forced to come up with their own solutions. Each camp I visited had tents devoted to the 
different services a community might need. From food stores to barber shops, the camps 
created their own survival mechanisms. 
Humanitarianism and Sovereignty 
The international community responds to humanitarian emergencies and crises by 
deploying the humanitarian industry. What the response entails, who receives it, who 
sends it, and the amount of aid are intimately linked to the political whims, needs, and 
decisions of the international community. That the international community can decide to 
either send troops or food aid to an area affected by a crisis reveals the complicated 
nature of sovereignty and how nation-states relate to each other. The issue of sovereignty 
and intervention is hotly debated, and the two are largely seen as in conflict with each 
other. Carola Weil describes the debate as being between state rights and individual 
rights: “The norms of sovereignty and nonintervention essentially protect borders. 
Human rights norms, by contrast, aim to protect individuals” (2001: 83). Most argue that 
the nation-state’s rights are being subsumed by the international community’s ability to 
intervene either militarily or otherwise in the name of human rights. However, the nation-
state and the international human rights regime are intertwined and related. A globalized 
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human rights regime is not destroying the geographically rooted nation-state system of 
equally sovereign states.  
 The Westphalian treaty marks the historically acknowledged beginning of the 
state and was created to limit international intervention in European states. Sovereignty 
was conceptualized as being based around the state and as geographically rooted within 
the state’s borders. The state has the ability to levy taxes and to protect its land and its 
people with the end goal of defending and protecting the state and its interests because 
the state and the people are often conceived to be one and the same. Therefore, the state 
has sovereignty within its own borders. However, and this has been true since the 
inception of the state system, if the state feels its interests are being threatened, it is 
within its jurisdiction and its right as a state to intervene. Therefore, if a state feels it is 
within its economic interest to conduct international trade, or engage militarily with 
another state, it is able to justify that interaction. Accordingly, sovereignty and the 
relationships between states change when states engage in any kind of global interactions. 
These global interactions lead to the construction of varying layers and levels of 
sovereignty. Sovereignty, according to Stephen Krasner, can be conceptualized in four 
different ways: 
Interdependence sovereignty refers to the ability of a government to regulate the 
movement of goods, capital, people, and ideas across its borders. Domestic 
sovereignty refers both to the structure of authority within a state and to the state’s 
effectiveness or control. International legal sovereignty refers to whether a state is 
recognized by other states, the basic rule being that only juridically independent 
territorial entities are accorded recognition. Westphalian sovereignty, which 
actually has almost nothing to do with the Peace of Westphalia, refers to the 
autonomy of domestic authority structures—that is, the absence of authoritative 
external influences. A political entity can be formally independent but de facto 
deeply penetrated. A state might claim to be the only legitimate enforcer of rules 
within its own territory, but the rules it enforces might not be of its own making 
(2001: 2).  
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The multiple ways in which sovereignty manifests itself reveals the social construction of 
sovereignty, nation-states and borders. Stuart Elden (2006) writes that absolute 
sovereignty is a “chimera and that international agreements of many kinds have created a 
system in which sovereignty is necessarily pooled, interdependent and limited. However, 
even the United Nations requires the ‘necessary fiction’ of sovereignty as a means of 
structuring international relations” (14).  Absolute state sovereignty is not being replaced 
by an international human rights regime; instead sovereignty manifests itself differently 
depending on the needs and decisions of the international community at large.  
The ability, or the decision, to intervene on an international level is rooted deeply 
in the construction of varying understandings of sovereignty. According the Carl Schmitt 
(1922), this ability to decide on the exception is what defines sovereignty. Sovereign is he 
“who decides in a situation of conflict what constitutes the public interests or interest of 
the state, public safety and order” (Schmitt 1922: 6). Therefore, the ability to decide on 
when intervention is required is rooted in sovereignty. The distribution of humanitarian 
aid or food aid, regardless of whether it involves the deployment of troops is still a form 
of intervention. The ability to decide to give aid, and who is deserving of it reflects a 
global sovereignty. Even if humanitarian intervention is based solely on the idea of 
“goodwill to fellow man” (Parekh 1997: 50), the ability to decide on the exception, in 
other words, the decision to intervene, rests on the shoulders of the sovereign because the 
sovereignty of another state is circumvented. Exceptional situations, a situation in which 
one state is deemed responsible or required to intervene in the affairs of another state are 
ultimately decided by the sovereign. The international community does not always 
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intervene when there are human rights abuses, natural disasters, famines, or 
underdevelopment in other states and if they do intervene, the type of intervention 
depends on the decisions of the sovereign.   
 Humanitarianism operates as a mechanism of governance and just as power 
circulates among individuals and institutions on a domestic level, so too does it circulate 
among and between nation-states. The humanitarian industry is one apparatus and 
discourse that is deployed to maintain and reproduce existing power structures. 
Therefore, the arguments that national sovereignty is declining because of the United 
Nations or the international human rights regime do not address the global power 
structures nor the shifting and constantly changing conceptions and realities of 
sovereignty. Anne Caldwell, drawing on Giorgio Agamben, uses the term “bio-
sovereignty” to address the changing faces of sovereignty:  
The increasing difficulty of localizing sovereignty in its former areas is one 
reason  sovereignty is often seen as declining. Agamben’s account of sovereignty 
as a space of indeterminacy is an important counter to those assumptions. The 
concept of bio-sovereignty lets us recognize the presence of sovereignty where 
older concepts built around the nation-state find only its disappearance. Insofar as 
sovereignty is a general power of regulating boundaries, whose ground is homo 
sacer, it has no necessary tie to particular territories of peoples. The impossibility 
of locating sovereignty in a precise territory or group does not signal a collapse of 
sovereignty but its transformation. (2004: 9). 
 
The ability of some states to dictate and control international institutions of governance is 
evident, and as those institutions grow to fit the demands of a globalized world, 
sovereignty continues to be transformed. As Jacques Derrida (2005) writes, “to confer 
sense or meaning on sovereignty, to justify it, to find a reason for it, is already a 
compromise in its deciding exceptionality” (101). Attempts at classifying different modes 
and types sovereignty as Krasner does is useful to help conceptualize how sovereignty is 
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changing and transforming, but it is also reveals the impossibility of specifically locating 
it within a set of laws or international norms. 
 Foucault’s concepts of power and knowledge are also important to understanding 
global sovereignty. Discourses that are dominant and knowledges that are accepted 
reflect power relations and the exercise of power. In other words, power is exercised 
through the construction of subjects and objects and the knowledge about them. 
Discourse and knowledge perpetuate the current distribution of power and as well as the 
production of discourses and policies that posit certain countries as having the knowledge 
and understanding of what it takes to become developed and the proper way of ensuring 
the protection of human rights. Jens Bartleson (1995) in Genealogy of Sovereignty 
explores this relationship between global sovereignty, power, and knowledge. The 
dominant discourses from the human rights regime and developmentalism create a cycle 
of mutual perpetuation between sovereignty and knowledge. 
 The relationship between power and knowledge is also evidenced in the 
construction of identities. The ability of some nation-states to decide on what constitutes 
a valid reason for intervention, humanitarian or otherwise, is dependent on unequal power 
distributions. The justification for intervention, especially humanitarian intervention, is 
generally based on constructions of states as being either real, quasi or failed, which itself 
is often linked to the binaries of developed and developing. Roxanne Doty, in her book 
Imperial Encounters (1996), addresses this unequal distribution of power, and the ability 
of one state or entity to construct realities and discourses about the other failed or quasi or 
developing state. She suggests that Northern countries created labels and identities that 
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not only enforce, but also allow and perpetuate their intervention in Southern countries. 
Discussing an MIT study on foreign aid, Doty argues that, 
The presumption was that some subjects were the definers, delimiters, and 
boundary setters of important practices and ideas such as participation and 
democracy and that others not capable themselves of making such definitions, 
would have these things bestowed upon them and would be permitted to enjoy 
them only under the circumstances deemed suitable by the United States (1996: 
139).  
  
In the final chapter I will explore in greater detail how humanitarianism helps to construct 
the identities and meanings of displaced populations, Haitians, and failed states.  
Humanitarianism as a Mechanism of Security 
In the last few decades, many academics, policy makers, activists and advocates have 
discussed the increasing securitization of societies. The securitization of migration is one 
aspect that is hotly debated, but securitization is related not just to the closing down of 
borders, or the proliferation in technologies of security but also reflects a changing 
discourse through which nation-states and the citizen are being constructed. Foucault 
describes security as a mechanism to maintain and control at the level of the population. 
(Foucault 2007). The discourses of security are increasingly being deployed and power is 
functioning through the mechanisms of security. Foucault (2007) defines the relationship 
between governmentality and security apparatuses as: 
The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the 
calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex 
form of power, which has as its target population, as its principal form of 
knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of 
security. The tendency which over a long period and throughout the West has 
steadily led towards the pre-eminence over all other forms (sovereignty, discipline 
etc.) of this type of power which may be termed government, resulting on one 
hand, in the formation of a whole series of specific governmental apparatuses, 
and, on the other, in the development of a whole complex of saviors (102). 
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Humanitarianism operating as a mechanism of security and governmentality can be 
understood by at least two related and interdependent processes. The first process is what 
Bigo (2002) describes as the “governmentality of unease,” which describes how the 
discourses of securitization are legitimized through various methods. This leads to (and is 
enforced by) the second process, which is biopower and the control and maintenance of 
internally displaced populations receiving humanitarian assistance at the level of the 
population. One fundamental aspect of this move to securitization is the framing of 
threats. Threats are constructed by the discourses and practices of security and security 
mechanisms are enacted to control and manage the threats.  
 Humanitarianism, an institution of global governance, is operating as a 
mechanism of securitization. Increasingly, humanitarian crises are being framed as 
threats to security and stability; the humanitarian industry is one global reaction to this. 
The 1990s saw an increase in the level of military involvement in humanitarian crises 
(Barnett 2005, Macrae 2001), from peacekeeping troops in Kosovo (1998) to the military 
occupation in Somalia (1992). The lines between military action and humanitarianism 
have become blurred and military action is justified in the name of human rights and 
peace. The use of the military in humanitarian crises reflects a shift in what humanitarian 
action looks like and means. When it comes to interventions, the framing of displaced 
persons as security threats justifies the use of military forces and other mechanisms of 
control over the displaced populations.  
Additionally, humanitarian crises spark increased fears of immigration, in the case 
of the earthquake in Haiti to the United States and Canada. This fear coincides with the 
securitization of migration, in which immigrants are constructed as a threat to the order 
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and stability of the nation-state. Bigo (2002) discusses the securitization of immigration 
as not only the result of racism and the rise of the far right in the political arena, but as 
also reflective of how we understand citizenship, the nation, and belonging: 
Securitization of the immigrant as a risk is based on our conception of the state as 
a body or container for the polity. It is anchored in the fears of politicians about 
losing their symbolic control over the territorial boundaries. It is structured by the 
habitus of the security professionals and their new interests not only in the 
foreigner but in the “immigrant.” These interests correlated with the globalization 
of technologies of surveillance and control going beyond the national borders. It 
is based, finally, on the “unease” that some citizens who feel discarded suffer 
because they cannot cope with the uncertainty of everyday life (2002: 3). 
 
Huysman (2006) discusses the objective and subjective nature of security threats and 
insecurity and highlights the role politics and economics have in shaping the policies and 
procedures that further securitization. The level of attention security threats receive 
depends on a hierarchy of threats constructed by policy makers, the media and the public. 
One mechanism for dealing with these threats, especially persons who are displaced 
internally, is through humanitarianism and the humanitarian industry.  
 The treatment of displaced persons highlights the subjective nature of the framing 
and creating of security threats. Aradau (2004) describes how trafficked sex workers are 
both victims in need of aid and security threats at the same time. The coupling of 
humanitarian aid and security mechanisms is what Aradau calls the “politics of pity” 
merging with the “politics of risk.” In a sense, the very act of being at risk causes a 
population to be a risk. This is not a new process, but how the international community, 
governments and institutions deal with these risky populations is increasingly securitized. 
Aradau writes, “to expose the perverse relation between the humanitarian and security 
articulations, I shall consider them as governmental processes: practical interventions 
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with the purpose of managing the phenomenon of trafficking” (2004: 253). The same can 
be said for international humanitarian aid. The humanitarian industry is a practical means 
of managing populations that have been displaced. The willingness of the international 
community to respond to disasters is not solely the result of displaced populations being 
framed as security threats, it also reflects the “politics of pity,” which rely on emotional 
appeals to help people in need. However, the “symptomatic subversion of pity by risk” 
(Aradau 2004: 255) is affecting humanitarian policies and programs. 
 Doty, as addressed earlier, discusses the politics of representation and how 
labeling and defining a population as the “other” creates a subjective reality to rely on 
when creating policies and programs. These identities have long been in place. Though 
they change, a fundamental divide in identity construction between the North and the 
South remains. This construction allows for intervention and  
these representational strategies are intensified in times of crisis when naturalized 
identities and the existing order are at risk of being called into question. This is 
consistent with the notion of hegemonizing practices intensifying during times of 
organic crisis when the North was confronted with the potential loss of control 
and authority (Doty 1996: 12).  
 
The times of crisis can be understood as environmental crises such as earthquakes, 
hurricanes, or droughts, or it can be tied to war, conflict and the failed state. In either 
case, as Huysman (2006) and Malmvig (2006) discuss, the decision to intervene is based 
on a series of factors in which risks are calculated and ranked.  
 Using humanitarianism as a mechanism of security relies on the framing of 
displaced persons as security threats. By constructing bodies or nations or communities 
as potential threats to stability and security, it allows, enables and justifies the use of 
humanitarianism. If populations are framed as violent and dangerous, it is necessary for 
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aid distribution to protect the safety of those involved. The case of the response to the 
Haiti earthquake highlights the level of control the international community has over 
displaced Haitians. The media and the humanitarian aid organizations represent Haitians, 
particularly Haitian men, as risks and threats. It is considered common knowledge that 
Haiti is a failed, fragile and/or insecure state, and that the men are volatile and dangerous. 
This was true even before the earthquake. As discussed in chapter one, the United States 
has sent military operations to Haiti since the early 1900s and since the coup d’état in 
2004, the UN has maintained a peace keeping force in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Thus the 
construction of Haitian bodies as security threats has existed for years, but the 
international response to the earthquake of 2010 reveals how the securitization discourses 
and mechanisms have affected the distribution of aid. This is most readily seen in the 
military response to the humanitarian disaster, but is also evidenced in the use of 
humanitarian organization’s control over the Haitian population. The two are not 
unrelated and they reveal a trend towards securing, monitoring and controlling 
threatening populations. 
 The United States military sent sixteen thousand troops (BBC News 2010) and the 
UN deployed seven thousand troops to respond to the Haiti earthquake (Beaumont and 
Tran 2010). The military troops were sent for at least two reasons: The first was to 
effectively and efficiently distribute aid. The advanced technologies of the military, 
particularly the American military, were seen as better able to distribute aid than the 
humanitarian organizations on the ground. The second reason was security. Admiral 
Mike Mullen, the chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, argued that, "In 
addition, the marines assigned to 24 MEU will be able to provide an additional force 
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capable of providing a secure environment for the ongoing relief efforts ashore in Haiti" 
(BBC News 2010). The United States military was one of the main distributors of aid and 
assisted most major humanitarian organizations, including World Health Organization, 
by creating a “secure environment” during the distribution of aid. The military presence 
was expected to reduce rioting and looting. Also, according to an Associated Press 
article, “Each American dollar roughly breaks down like this: 42 cents for disaster 
assistance, 33 cents for United States military aid, nine cents for food, nine cents to 
transport the food, five cents for paying Haitian survivors for recovery efforts, just less 
than one cent to the Haitian government, and about half a cent to the Dominican 
Republic” (Fisch 2010). The distribution of aid money reveals that the second highest 
amount goes to security. 
 International organizations and non-Haitian aid workers have the majority of the 
control in the distribution of aid. The earthquake in Haiti devastated the country’s capital 
and as such has greatly affected the economy and the ability of the country to produce 
and distribute food and water. The Haitian people needed assistance and will continue to 
need assistance in the coming months to survive. What is problematic, however, is the 
level of control the international community (by way of humanitarian organizations) have 
on the bodies of the Haitian people. The international community now controls not only 
the eating schedules of displaced Haitians, but also which Haitians receive food aid. It 
controls where they sleep and their access to health care. The camps are policed and 
securitized on a twenty-four-hour basis and they are under strict surveillance.  
 The media coverage of the humanitarian industry in Haiti following the 
earthquake highlights the level of control the international community has over the lives 
 71 
and bodies of Haitians. One Al Jazeera headline reads, “The World Food Programme 
(WFP) has temporarily halted food aid to about 10,000 survivors of Haiti’s earthquake 
after some people tried to use fake coupons to secure rations” (2010). The WFP, in an 
attempt to punish a few Haitians who were cheating the system, is able to withhold food 
from tens of thousands of people, many of whom were obeying the rules dictated by the 
organization. The humanitarian aid workers are able to decide who is able to eat and who 
is not and the humanitarian organizations now wield much more power than the Haitian 
government, which is perceived as being largely ineffective at distributing aid. However, 
as is evidenced in how American aid has been distributed, the Haitian government, which 
was crippled by the earthquake, received little to no humanitarian assistance. In a New 
York Times article about the coupon system, Haitians who had not received food aid 
were described as “desperate, hungry and still not satisfied, they said they were looking 
for the white men in control of food distribution. They needed coupons. They needed to 
eat” (New York Times 2010)  
 “Aid workers helped Romaine Vincent Donal, 44, load her belongings in 
wheelbarrows... She said she couldn’t wait to leave, though she didn’t know where she 
was going” (Mozingo 2010) reads an article from the Los Angeles Times on 11 April 
2010. With hurricane season approaching, fears of flooding in makeshift camps prompted 
many to be relocated. The international community and aid workers had complete control 
of where the camps were to be relocated and as the quote suggests, Haitians not only had 
no part in the decisions to relocate, but were often unaware of their destination or the 
location of the new camps. 
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Haitian IDP camps as security sites 
International organizations, operating as mechanisms of governmentality, thus represent 
the importance of security in the distribution of aid and the management of IDP camps. 
Valerie Kaussen, deploying Agamben’s concept of the state of exception, details how the 
Haitian IDP camp reveals a move toward “the camp” as a site of exception: 
What all these spaces share is the suspension of national, territorial law and its 
replacement by police power. Those who reside in these legal dead zones are no 
longer “citizens”; they live in a state of exception to the law of the land and—
“exceptions” that are becoming more and more the rule. Haiti’s IDP camps are 
indeed “states of exception” that risk becoming permanent fixtures in the post-
earthquake urban landscape in and around Port-au-Prince. While Haitian law 
applies as a matter of course to IDP residents who remain Haitian citizens, in 
practice, the “rights” of these individuals do not have the full backing of the law 
but depend on the goodwill of the organization or person in charge—often with 
the support of the Haitian National Police, privately hired gunmen, and the UN 
Stabilization Mission in Haiti (2011: 37). 
 
The camps are states of exception in that they exist both within the realm of law, but also 
outside of it. There is no universal international governing body to regulate the operations 
of the camps and Haitian law seemingly does not apply. The inability of Haitian law to 
provide basic human rights for its displaced citizens is not a simple case of the state’s 
failure, as will be discussed in the final chapter, but also the power the humanitarian 
organizations wield over the Haitian population. This power, as illustrated in the IDP 
camp as a “state of exception,” means that humanitarian organizations are in complete 
control over the distribution of basic services to the majority of the Haitians displaced by 
the 2010 earthquake.  
This analysis is critical to understanding Haitian IDP camps and Humanitarian 
organizations, but for the remainder of this chapter, I will examine how mechanisms of 
security are influencing how the displaced Haitians and IDP camps are dealt with and 
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administered. The issue of security is important to how the international community, the 
Haitian state, and the displaced population interact. Miguel De Larrinaga and Marc G. 
Doucet in their 2008 article “Sovereign Power and the Biopolitics of Human Security” 
articulate the increasing role of security in humanitarian practices: 
Human security is instrumental in sovereign power’s ability to delineate the 
circumstances in which such a state of exception can be proclaimed. What the 
discourse of human security does, whether broad or narrow, is to help define the 
exceptional circumstances that require the international community’s intervention, 
whether on behalf of humanitarian imperatives as initially conceived or in the 
service of maintaining global order as made evident more recently (532). 
 
Therefore, the humanitarian organization, operating as an apparatus of the sovereign 
exception, contributes to an increase in the securitization of particular societies. Security 
is articulated in two important ways in Haitian IDP camps. The first is the issue of the 
physical safety and security of Haitians and aid workers. The second is through the 
manner in which the camps are administered. The administration of camps reveals the 
ways in which security operates as a means of managing displaced Haitians as a 
population.  
 There is a large international police and military presence on the ground in Haiti. 
One cluster meeting I attended discussed the need for the foreign military in Haiti. The 
goals of the military were not necessarily to save lives, alleviate suffering, or prepare for 
another disaster but instead to “create security” (United Nations Cluster Meeting 
presentation 2010). International NGOs hire security consultants and security “concerns” 
dominate the conversations at UN cluster meetings. International aid workers have strict 
curfews and live in gated communities with security guards. Many voiced concern over 
the lack of security during aid distributions. The representative from Samaritan’s Purse I 
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spoke with said that security was a major concern during distributions, and that they were 
unable to afford their own private security. However, when pressed, he said that in the six 
months he had been working in Haiti there had only been one “security event” in which a 
group of men attempted to take over a distribution truck and the UN showed up within 
five minutes and “neutralized the situation.” According to the security advisor for ICRC, 
his number one priority was the protection of aid workers.  
 I am not arguing that the safety of aid workers is not important, or that an 
organization should not be concerned with the health and safety of its employees – 
because, as one Red Cross worker said, “who wants to call someone’s parents and tell 
them their child has been kidnapped and murdered?” (Interview with Red Cross aid 
worker 2010). However I do want to question the focus on security and the practical 
implementations of security measures on the displaced populations. How do security 
measures ultimately impact displaced Haitians and do they actually ensure their safety? 
Or are they instead just another mechanism of security in which populations are framed 
as being in need of security and certain lives (those of international aid workers) are 
deemed worthy of saving while others are not? 
 The emphasis on the security of aid workers from the threat of displaced Haitians 
reveals the power of representational practices of Haitians as security threats. Although 
the physical “security” presence is important for understanding the situation in the IDP 
camps, it is also important to understand how security is “managed.” The mechanisms of 
security do not attempt to eliminate security threats altogether, but instead attempt to 
manage them on the level of the population. Quoting Foucault, Larrinaga and Doucet 
explain the management of threat as follows: 
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One of the key dynamics in Foucault’s analysis of the relationship between 
security and circulation is, therefore, that security’s object remains beyond its 
grasp, that the deployment of the technologies of security is done within a context 
marked by the impossibility of eliminating insecurity altogether. It is a project, as 
Foucault (2007: 20) notes, that is oriented towards a future that is “not exactly 
controllable, not precisely measured or measurable”, and good management 
“takes into account precisely what might happen” (2008: 524).  
 
 
One MINUSTAH spokesman at an NGO coordination meeting defined security as safety 
and ensuring continuity. He stated, “the security protocol is monitoring.” Creating an 
atmosphere of “security” is not about eliminating security threats, which would be 
difficult given that Haitian men are often monolithically represented as potential threats, 
but instead is a means of managing and controlling threats.  
 One method of management is data collection. Data collection includes 
conducting censes of camp populations and services, map making, and creating labels 
and distinctions between populations, for example what constitutes a “camp” versus a 
“tent settlement”, or classifying levels of vulnerability. Data collection is, in on one hand, 
the result of the bureaucratization of humanitarian organizations. Large bureaucratic 
organizations require data for grant reporting, accountability, and as a method of 
managing money, employees, and their constituents, in this case, the internally displaced 
Haitians.  
Data collection, however, is also related to the mechanisms of security that seek 
to manage populations. As the MINUSTAH representative stated, security is managing. 
One of the major focuses of large humanitarian organizations is surveillance and data 
collection. One Haitian camp manager I spoke to complained that to the IOM “data is 
more important than camp infrastructure” (interview with camp manager 2010). The UN 
and IOM have sophisticated needs assessment surveys, for which it can take up to six 
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weeks to gather the information. There are comprehensive and rolling diagnoses to 
determine the situations in the camps. Another camp manger said he went to an IOM 
Camp Manager training session. He said it lasted four hours and focused almost 
exclusively on gathering statistics and on how to “get a grip on the situation” (interview 
with camp manager 2010).   
 Another important aspect of management is the ranking and categorizing of 
vulnerabilities. Part of the data collection and surveillance is the determination of who is 
most deserving of aid and who is most vulnerable. In the following chapter, I will explore 
how Haitian women and children are framed as in need of protection from Haitian males. 
What is also interesting is the role “vulnerability” plays in the distribution of aid in the 
camps. After blanket distributions of aid ended, organizations began to focus on 
distributing aid to “vulnerable populations.” The definition of vulnerability tended to vary 
between organizations, but the theme of ranking vulnerabilities remained the same. For 
example, Samaritan’s Purse had a form with boxes to check in order to receive food 
packets. One had to check at least two boxes to receive the distributions. The checklist 
included: displaced people without housing, people with AIDS, disabled, the very young, 
the very old, pregnant, or single mothers. The ability to determine vulnerability is a 
reflection of the power relations between humanitarian aid workers and the displaced 
populations. Additionally, in order to check one of the boxes the Haitian had to provide 
documentation proving vulnerability. Not only were Haitians forced to defend their 
vulnerability, the documentation was a means of surveillance and a way of categorizing 
them into distinguishable groups of vulnerable populations.  
 77 
 As illustrated before, a contradictory dualism exists in the narratives of 
displacement. The decision of who will receive humanitarian aid is not based solely on a 
perceived level of vulnerability but also on who most deserves aid. For example, a group 
of tents is not an IDP camp unless the IOM and the UN determine it is. The determination 
rests on an arbitrarily decided number of tents/people, location of the camp, and if there 
is camp management. With the distinction of an official “IDP camp” comes a promise of 
aid distributions and also surveillance. The process of deciding which camps are “real” 
camps and not just tent settlements is based on a series of surveys and censes. 
Additionally, “vulnerability” does not necessarily give a displaced “vulnerable” Haitian 
more access to services. Instead, aid workers also have the discretion to determine if a 
displaced person deserves the aid. In deciding who receives more permanent housing 
(wooden structures with plastic tarps as walls), people who were employed and owned 
houses prior to the earthquake are given preferential access.  
Security is increasingly framed as the first step to achieving development, human 
rights, and good governance. As UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan stated in 2004:  
Development and security are inextricably linked. A more secure world is only 
possible if poor countries are given a real chance to develop. Extreme poverty and 
infectious diseases threaten many people directly, but they also provide a fertile 
breeding ground for other threats, including civil conflicts. Even people in rich 
countries will be more secure if their Governments help poor countries to defeat 
poverty and disease by meeting the Millennium Development Goals. (UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan, cited in United Nations 2004: vii) 
 
Annan is suggesting two things. The first is that without security, there is no 
development, yet ironically, he is also suggesting that poverty (and underdevelopment) 
breeds insecurity. This is a theme that I have suggested throughout this thesis, namely the 
cyclical and often contradictory ways in which poverty, security and humanitarianism are 
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represented within the discourses of politicians, the media and humanitarian 
organizations. It speaks first to the intangibility of the causes and sources of insecurity, as 
well as to the ultimate inability to fully achieve a secure society or a secure world and 
instead demands for an increase in the mechanisms of security.  
Humanitarianism is a mechanism that is now being deployed by the international 
community in response to the growing influences of discourses of security. 
Humanitarianism operating as a mechanism of security is related to the securitization of 
migration in that both are responses to global attempts to secure nation-states from real 
and perceived threats. It does not matter if the threats will actually endanger the nation-
state or its citizens. Humanitarianism as a mechanism of security operates as a means and 
justification for controlling and monitoring populations. Humanitarianism, as a 
mechanism of global governance is one mechanism that responds to security threats 
through means of biopower and control. Agamben in Homo Sacer (1998) writes that, 
“humanitarian organizations are in perfect symmetry with state power” and 
“humanitarian organizations can only grasp human life in the figure of bare or sacred life 
and therefore, despite themselves maintain a secret solidarity with the very powers they 
ought to fight” (133). Humanitarianism has always been linked to governments and the 
international community and has always been an institutions of power, however, as the 
discourses of security become more influential, humanitarianism increasingly operates as 
a mechanism of securitization. 
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Chapter Three: Representational Practices and the Construction of 
Threat 
 
Thus far this thesis has explored the relationships between security, governance, 
humanitarianism and intervention in Haiti. Critically analyzing the dominant discourses 
about humanitarianism and their relationship to sovereignty and governmentality shows 
the construction of Haitians and the Haitian state as being in need of security and security 
mechanisms. This chapter explores the importance of representational practices in 
relation to humanitarianism and the Haitian population and state. Haitians are 
discursively portrayed in a particular way that justifies intervention and securitization. 
Understanding the power dynamics and the relationships between power, sovereignty and 
the construction of meanings and identities is critical to understanding the humanitarian 
response to the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. In this chapter, I hope to challenge the 
ahistorical and static representation of Haitians and the Haitian state as needing 
humanitarian assistance, as being violent and as posing a security threat. I will also 
interrogate the assumption that Haiti is a “failed” or “fragile” state. Instead, I suggest that 
these representations are reflections of the relationship between power and knowledge, 
humanitarian organizations and states, and the perceptions and construction of the 
“other.” The chapter will examine the relationships between humanitarianism, poverty 
and security to illuminate the power of discursive representations and identities in the 
construction of who needs humanitarian assistance and how to best deliver humanitarian 
aid. 
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Representational practices of Haitians 
“Haiti was a disaster and then the earthquake happened” 
Popular saying among humanitarian aid workers in Haiti 
The popular representations of Haiti and the Haitian population have long been discussed 
in terms of race, culture, religion, poverty, and ideas of backwardness. Using the 
language of humanitarianism and intervention has allowed the interveners, be it the UN 
or the United States government, to influence how Haiti is portrayed. This portrayal of 
Haitians, as being in need of assistance, as being incapable of governing themselves, as 
being violent or mob like, has justified the long history of involvement of the 
international community in Haiti. The relationship of domination, or intervention, is not 
static or linear either, but instead works cyclically: Representational practices construct 
meaning and identities, which in turn justify interventions, which are then employed to 
further create and justify the constructed identities.  
 Foucault’s discussions about power can help to conceptualize the role of 
discursive power in interventions. Power cannot be understood as being unidirectional, as 
something that one owns or possesses, but instead as something one practices. 
Understanding power in a relational way helps us to see how humanitarian aid workers, 
by utilizing the narratives created by their organizations and the governments that fund 
them, are helping to perpetuate the dominant discourses of Haitians and the role of 
international interventions in Haiti. During my fieldwork in Haiti, I found that each time I 
sat with international aid workers and asked them questions about their work in Haiti, 
they were able to repeat almost verbatim the information found on the websites of their 
organizations. Most organizations have mission statements and protocols that must be 
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followed and predetermined talking points when dealing with reporters and researchers. 
Naturally, this is a result of the bureaucratization, institutionalization, and rationalization 
of humanitarian organizations, but it also reflects how discourses are produced and 
reproduced through the humanitarian organizations.  
 Drawing on Foucault and those influenced by his discourses, I will to discuss how 
the representational practices of Haitians, via humanitarian operations and institutions has 
helped, or justified, the framing of displaced Haitians and the Haitian state as security 
threats to themselves, to aid workers, and to the international community. This first 
section will outline the discursive representational practices of the international 
community about Haiti and Haitians and how interventions and humanitarian assistance 
aids in the production of meanings and identities. Roxanne Doty, in Imperial Encounters 
(1996) outlines the relationship between the North and the South and the discursive 
power of identity construction in understanding the presumed natural conflicts between 
the “north” and the “south.” She calls these interactions “asymmetrical encounters”:  
Arguably one of the most consequential elements present in all of the encounters 
between the North and the South has been the practice(s) of representation by the 
North of the South. By representation I mean the ways in which the South has 
been discursively represented by policy makers, scholars, journalists and others in 
the North. This does not refer to the “truth” and “knowledge” that the North has 
discovered and accumulated about the South, but rather to the ways in which the 
regimes of “truth” and “knowledge” have been produced. The contexts within 
which specific encounters have taken place and the issues relevant to these 
contexts have been occasions for the proliferation and circulation of various 
representations (Doty 1996: 2). 
 Doty provides an important framework through which to understand not only identity, 
but also conceptualizations of culture, race, and poverty and how these issues are 
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intertwined with our understanding of identity as something that is not natural, but 
discursively produced.  
 There is a certain perceived naturalness about the relationship between Haiti and 
the international community. This perception is historically rooted in the past encounters 
of the international community with Haiti as was illustrated in the section about Haiti’s 
history of humanitarianism and intervention. Yet, the framing of displaced persons in 
Haiti is not unique. Citizens of the global south or migrant populations in the north are all 
discursively represented in particular ways that reflect unequal power distributions. I 
argue that the construction of dominant discourses about populations ‘in need’ of 
intervention allows for humanitarianism to function as a mechanism of governance. 
When intervention is framed as humanitarian or as a civilizing mission, or as bringing 
democracy or as a state building project, it reveals the ability of the interveners to 
construct what intervention is, who is able to intervene, and ultimately who is deserving 
of intervention. Those who are doing the intervention define the rules of the game and the 
actors involved. The reasons for intervention are presumed to be economic (for example, 
development or modernization projects) or militaristic (for example, human rights 
intervention, peacekeeping missions) but the social and cultural difference between 
communities is taken as a given.  
 Doty describes the realm of politics as the space “wherein the very identities of 
peoples, states, and regions are constructed through representational practices” (1996: 2). 
Doty focuses on how Foucault’s work on power can help to understand how political 
identities are constructed. When Judith Butler, in Precarious Life, asks, “What makes for 
a grievable life?” (2004: 20), she is ultimately asking who counts as a political subject? 
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What are the politics of mourning and grieving? Who gets mourned and who gets swept 
aside? Claudia Aradau (2004) discusses the politics of risk and the politics of pity when 
dealing with trafficked women. The women are represented as something to be both 
pitied and feared. However, these two politics are not contradictory but instead form and 
influence each other. As soon as the trafficked women are considered deserving of pity 
they also represent a risk. Haitians can be described in the same way; their poverty makes 
them both pitiful and dangerous. The depoliticization and repoliticization of populations 
and people is important in our understanding of how the millions of displaced Haitians 
are not only represented in the “realm of politics” but also how humanitarian 
organizations respond to their displacement. Agamben in his explorations of the 
phenomenon of “bare life” or homo sacer describes this space of politicization and 
depoliticization as a sovereign sphere “in which it is permitted to kill without committing 
homicide and without celebrating a sacrifice and sacred life- that is life that may be killed 
but not sacrificed- is the life that has been captured in this sphere” (1995: 83). Creating 
representations of “others” is not an unbiased portrayal of cultural or ethnic difference, 
but instead occurs as a means of separating and constructing an identity that can be 
contrasted with others and dealt with accordingly.  
This chapter will focus on the relationship between poverty, security and 
humanitarianism within this realm of politics. Haiti is represented as “the poorest country 
in the western hemisphere” and Haitians as being accustomed to violence and 
deprivation, poverty and hunger. “Haiti was a disaster and then the earthquake hit” was 
an oft-repeated slogan by aid and missionary workers in Haiti. What hope is there for this 
small, abject country where women and children eat mud? As a 2008 Guardian article 
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states, “Haiti: Mud cakes become staple diet as cost of food soars beyond a family’s 
reach”? The lives of Haitians are less grievable not just because of racism or imperialism, 
but also because of their poverty and the extremity of their situation. Haitians represent 
the limits of the possibilities of human suffering; the majority of the population was 
impoverished, hungry and abused even before the earthquake hit and their state has 
“failed.” Dominant discourses on Haiti portray it “as a place where the ordinary 
constraints of human society do not apply “(Fischer 2007: 2). 
 Sybylle Fischer (2007) wrote Haiti: Fantasies of Bare Life in which she uses 
Agamben’s conceptualization of bare life to criticize media and photographic 
representations of Haitians. Understanding the portrayal of the Haitian body through the 
lens provided by the concept of bare life is crucial to understanding how Haitians are 
represented. Although for the remainder of this thesis I will focus on other aspects of 
representational practices, specifically the portrayal of Haitians as a population in need of 
intervention and security, I believe that this analysis deserves mention and is not 
unrelated. I think that Fischer’s article articulates well the representation of Haitians as 
depoliticized “others”, and the manner in which these representations are often 
manifested in portrayals of Haitians as bodies in suffering. Fischer explains her tactic as,  
Appropriating Agamben’s term, fantasies of “bare life”—where I take “bare life” 
to be an emblem of a highly ambivalent attitude toward bodily degradation of 
humans. What happens when we rhetorically, philosophically, or 
photographically reduce human beings to their mere physical being, to their 
suffering, to their mortality? (2007: 4) 
Focusing on a book of photographs by photographer Bruce Gilden, Haiti (1996), Fischer 
explores how the photographic representation of Haitians as bare lives, as depoliticized 
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bodies, is illustrative of not just the exploitative nature of disaster photography5 but also 
as a means of conceptualizing the political nature of suffering and leaving the viewer 
with a particular understanding of Haitians as bare life. In this way, 
Haiti is returned to the reader as the bare-boned, incomprehensible place of 
unspeakable cruelty and bodily suffering, of Tonton Macoutes and “voodoo 
doctors” and corpses drifting in muddy swimming pools, as a liminal space on the 
edge of Western civilization, without the social and political practices and taboos 
that constitute life in Western society (Fischer 2007: 3).  
Fischer wrote this article in 2007. Arguably, the photographic representations of Haitian 
earthquake victims only further serves to prove her (and Agamben’s) point. Haitians are 
portrayed as bodies that are caught in the limits of the sovereign exception. What purpose 
does it serve the public to show images of mass graves or of children in hospitals with 
amputated arms? Fischer’s argues that it reveals the depoliticized nature of Haitians in 
the public eye and ultimately it is reflective of the representational practices that produce 
identity and meaning that create and circulate (and thus perpetuate) our understandings of 
Haitians as apolitical, suffering beings. As Fischer argues,  
Representation of violence creates a certain form of complicity because it engages 
psychical structures of attraction and repulsion. Historical, philosophical, or 
representational contextualization, the restoration of contingency, and the 
reflexive awareness of standpoint, by contrast, work against this complicity (2007: 
8). 
For the remainder of this section, I will discuss the discursive representation of Haiti and 
Haitians within academia, the media, and humanitarian organizations and how particular 
identities are constructed to encourage or explain intervention and humanitarianism. Two 
major themes can be discerned in academic articles and books, media reports and 
                                                        
5 Disaster Photography is a sensationalist and objectifying means of portraying disaster victims. Disaster 
photography often portrays humans in a violent and inhumane way 
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humanitarian policies and programs that I would like to focus on concerning how Haiti is 
portrayed and represented. The first is the word hope. I would never suggest that hopes 
and dreams are problematic, but instead want to focus on the representational 
implications of one having “hope” for Haiti. The second is what I will call “blaming 
history.” Academic writing, the media and humanitarian policies about Haiti often 
discuss the reasons for Haiti’s underdevelopment and poverty and their portrayal of 
Haiti’s history is illustrative of how representations of Haiti are cultivated and 
constructed. 
Is there “Hope” for Haiti? 
“Haiti, poorest of countries in the Western Hemisphere, may now have some chance to 
move into the future with greater hope for peace and economic advancement” (Catholic 
Web 2006). Questioning if Haiti can ever move into the “future” and if Haiti has “hope” 
to overcome its instability and underdevelopment paints a particular discursive picture of 
Haiti and Haitians. Haitians are represented as the poorest of the poor and their poverty 
along with their violent history seems to be insurmountable. Hope, these authors seem to 
suggest, is something Haitians may not have or something that must be given to them. 
Hans Veeken, an MSF aid worker, wrote an article for British Medical Journal about his 
trip to Haiti in 1993 titled “Hope for Haiti?” Discussing the preparations for a trip to a 
small island off the coast of Haiti, Veeken provides us with a gold mine of stereotypical 
representations of Haiti and Haitians: 
Nobody in town, however, could give me any sensible information on the current 
situation on the island. Nobody had been there, but everybody had a horror story 
to discourage me. “Take along drinking water because there is typhoid,” was the 
advice given to me as I left for the island. The “tap-tap”, a small van meant for 
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public transport, wriggled through the outskirts of Port au Prince. As usual, we 
first had to refuel. At the gas station I noticed, instead of the normal pool of oil, a 
pool of blood on the ground. To my astonishment I discovered in the bushes at the 
side a corpse, beheaded. “Military,” said my companion. The facts of the case did 
not seem to bother anybody; they are used to terror. (1993: 2) 
Within a single paragraph Veeken broadly sweeps through the culture of rumors and 
paranoia, to a reference to “tap-taps” the “small van meant for public transport”, implying 
perhaps their inefficiency or in the very least their exoticness, to finally, of course, a 
beheaded corpse and the subsequent “used to terror” analysis. Not all academic articles 
are as blatant in their representations of Haiti, but the theme remains. Haiti is hopeless, 
caught in a vicious cycle of violence and poverty. It is a cycle that millions of dollars of 
aid and thousands of nonprofits have not been able to break and that Haitians, ultimately, 
are “used to.”  
Following the 2010 earthquake celebrities and non-profit organizations quickly 
organized a fundraising event similar in nature to Band Aid, a “charity super group” 
founded in 1984 to donate money to famine relief in Ethiopia. Hope for Haiti was based 
on a similar principle: A large group of celebrities and musicians came together for a 
musical fundraising telethon. While there were multiple criticisms of organizational 
problems - Wycelf Jean’s organization, Yele Haiti, which hosted the event has had 
multiple problems with the Internal Revenue Service, and there has been speculation that 
some of the charity’s money has gone to rent and recording studios (The Smoking Gun 
2010) - I would rather focus on the discursive importance of an entire population “having 
hope”, and on the power relations inherent in the idea that celebrities, bands, people from 
Western countries, etc., can “give hope”. Much like the language of “empowerment” 
through which development agencies attempt to give power to the powerless, giving 
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“hope”- an intangible but important emotion- to Haitians reveals the language of 
intervention and humanitarianism. Hope for Haiti is something that must be bestowed on 
Haitians by outside populations, because ultimately without foreign intervention, they are 
potentially hopeless.  
 The power of hope within the realm of humanitarian discourses is not lost on 
economists either. Paul Collier, a financial advisor for the United Nations states 
optimistically, “Haiti is not hopeless” in his report for the Secretary General of the United 
Nations: Haiti: From Natural Disaster to Economic Security in 2009. There is room for 
economic growth by focusing on the opening up of free trade agreements, reducing tariffs 
on exports, and improving the garment industry. Collier discusses the appropriately 
named HOPEII, a free trade agreement that “gave Haiti uniquely favorable preferential 
access to the US market” (2009: 3). Collier believes that Haiti does have hope and it lies 
in free market capitalism. 
 The deployment of the word hope in discussions about Haiti reveals both the 
power dynamics between Haiti and its benefactors, (i.e., the international community at 
large), and the ability to “give hope” to a potentially hopeless population caught in 
unimaginable poverty. This downward cycle of poverty and violence leads us to the 
second issue, namely, the blaming of Haiti’s history. 
History of Misery 
 “The root explanation of errant Haiti probably lies in the circumstances of the 
independence of which it is so proud”(Crassweller 1971). 
Academic and newspaper articles and policy reports about Haiti often start with a brief 
overview of the history of Haiti. They often begin with a discussion of Haiti as the “pearl 
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of Antilles,” the triumph of the first successful slave revolution, and then the subsequent 
decline into poverty and isolation. They rarely fail to mention the debt owed to France 
and the violent coups that have plagued the country since it achieved independence. What 
is problematic about this narrative is not the recognition that history has played a part in 
the making of modern Haiti, but instead the deterministic discussion about Haiti. Haiti is 
portrayed as being caught in a vicious cycle that it cannot escape. Haitians are portrayed 
as being caught in the past from which they cannot move forward. As the quote above by 
the first “Hope for Haiti” article suggests, they cannot move into the future. The lack of 
hope for Haiti, its inherent hopelessness, is due to its historical situation; it is trapped in 
its violent past. As Pamela Constable suggests, 
After the promising 1990 election, which was heralded as the first step toward 
democracy, Haiti appears to have slipped back into the tradition of violent, 
absolutionist politics that have dominated the country during the two centuries of 
French plantation slavery and another 150 years of despotic, post revolutionary 
self-rule (1993: 175).  
Blaming Haiti’s history, or Haiti’s culture or Haiti’s traditionalism allows for the 
construction of Haitians as a people who need of foreign assistance and intervention to 
help them out of their past and into the future, a culture or nation who seem unable to 
escape their “traditional” cycles of poverty. The academic tradition of painting Haiti’s 
history as deterministic and insurmountable silences and ignores other understandings of 
Haiti’s underdevelopment and political violence and constructs a vision of Haiti that 
allows for intervention and creates and recreates a particular discursive representation of 
Haiti.  
 “The Jan. 12, 2010 earthquake is only the latest tragedy in Haiti”s long history of 
torment and strife” reads the introduction to Time Magazine’s 2010 photo essay “History 
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of Misery.” In eleven slides, Haiti’s history is described from Christopher Columbus to 
Papa Doc to the earthquake. Time’s piece paints an easily digestible view of Haiti’s 
history. In simple terms, Haiti has always been in a state of crisis and Haitians have 
always been oppressed. Media portrayal of Haitian history as one of misery and torment 
and strife helps construct the identity of Haitians as that of people stuck in a downward 
cycle of oppression and violence. Haitians are victims of their own history, which 
continues to repeat itself in crisis after crisis: The earthquake, the cholera outbreaks, and 
the hurricanes are only the latest in a long series of events that have battered the small 
island. 
 These are only two examples of how discursive representations of Haiti help to 
construct identities and meanings about Haiti as a country in need of intervention. In the 
following section I will explore how the international community discursively represents 
Haiti and Haitians as security threats. The portrayal of Haitians as poor, hopeless and 
stuck in a cycle of poverty and violence aid in the construction of them as threats to 
themselves and to international security.  
Construction of the Haitian as a security threat  
Jef Huysmans in The Politics of Insecurity (2006) describes the widening of security 
studies to include non-military threats to states and communities. He focuses particularly 
on the reframing of immigrants and refugees as security threats to the European Union 
and the political implications of redefining what security is and how we understand and 
deal with issues of “security:” 
When established knowledge patterns are challenged by means of shifting the 
meaning of one of its defining concepts both an identity and status problem occur. 
Moving the meaning of security beyond military threats in an inter-state world did 
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precisely something along these lines. In blurring the received meaning of the 
concept of security it challenged and by implication made visible the implicitly 
agreed and ritualized boundaries of the study of security in international relations 
(Huysmans 2006: 21).  
 
The increasing number of threats placed under the umbrella of “security” makes defining 
security and security studies difficult and distracts from the understanding of “security as 
a technique of government” (Huysmans 2006: 6). However, this thesis is not concerned 
with how to define security as such, but instead how security, as a mechanism of power, 
and in turn, humanitarian organizations as a mechanism of security, construct and create 
security threats and then attend to them.  
Constructing Haitians, especially young Haitian males, as security threats is not 
the result of a simple risk calculation in which the acts of Haitians are enumerated and 
counted and then determined to be risky, dangerous, or threatening. Instead, it is the 
result of a social and historical construction of Haitians as risky, dangerous and 
threatening. As the previous section discussed, Haitians “have a long history of violence” 
and their abject poverty puts them at the extremes of human suffering. As poverty 
increasingly becomes a security concern, so too do the impoverished individuals. Isin 
(2004), drawing on Foucault, describes how biopower developed as a means of managing 
populations:  
Foucault called that power which took as its object to calibrate the relationship 
between the body and the species-body as biopower. What was new about 
biopower, he argued, was its simultaneously individualizing and totalizing 
character. In other words, the object of biopower was a peculiar “calibration”. 
Governing subjects required a calibration of their conduct to the requirements of 
species-bodies—economy, population, and society—in a manner that involved 
fine adjustments to both the body and the species-body (221) 
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In the case of framing Haitians as security threats, what is of particular interest in this 
passage is the concept of the “simultaneously individualizing and totalizing character” of 
biopower and governmentality under neoliberalism. The individual, in this case the 
Haitian, is constructed as a security threat to the community, to women and children, and 
to international aid workers. Within constructing the Haitian individual as a threat there is 
a simultaneous creation of a totalizing character of all Haitians as security threats. This 
construction thus allows for an increase in control over the population by humanitarian 
organizations.  
 Bigo’s analysis in “Governmentality of Unease” (2002) provides us with a 
framework for understanding how the professionals in the “management of unease” 
construct threats and identify risks to their polity:  
It [the polity] is a “war-based polity,” a condition of generalized confrontation 
that is no longer able to distinguish between private and public enemies. Because 
it is based on claims about the need for survival at any price, on a real and 
permanent struggle anchored in an eschatology of the worst kind, it generates a 
distress policy, a misgiving policy, that transforms any change and any risk into 
an intentional threat or enemy. Here is the main technique of securitization, to 
transform structural difficulties and transformations into elements permitting 
specific groups to be blamed, even before they have done anything, simply by 
categorizing them, anticipating profiles of risk from previous trends, and 
projecting them by generalization upon the potential behavior of each individual 
pertaining to the risk category. (81) 
 
Although framing Haitians as security threats may not be new, the professionalization 
and institutionalization of the unease about risks and threats is, as Bigo describes. 
Portraying Haitians as risks and threats to the international community, to Haitian women 
and to themselves is not just about racism (which I will discuss later), but is also about 
the management of unease. The securitization of Haitian IDPs and IDP camps is about 
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categorizing, blaming and transforming the Haitian into a risk that needs to be secured 
against.  
 Claudia Aradau (2004) describes the relationship between humanitarianism, 
security, and governmentality in the case of trafficked women:  
To expose the perverse relation between the humanitarian and security 
articulations, I shall consider them as governmental processes: practical 
interventions with the purpose of managing the phenomenon of trafficking. 
Coined by Michel Foucault, “government” in this sense refers to acting on the 
actions of individuals, taken either singly or collectively, so as to shape, guide, 
conduct and modify the ways in which they conduct themselves. (253) 
 
Humanitarian organizations, by identifying Haitians as security threats in need of 
securing against are thus able to maintain an increasing level of control over the 
internally displaced Haitians. The act of framing and constructing Haitians as threats is 
fundamental to humanitarianism operating as a mechanism of security because it 
maintains that the Haitians need security and that “we” need to be secured against the 
Haitians. Security is necessary to development and only the international community, via 
humanitarian organizations and the military, are able to create a secure environment for 
Haitians. Haitians need to be secure in order to be protected from themselves.  
MINUSTAH has been operating as a national policing force for the protection of 
aid workers and securitizing the distribution centers and the distribution process to 
safeguard against rioting and violence. The international community has framed Haitian 
men as violent bodies that threaten not only the political stability of Haiti, but also the 
lives of Haitian women and the aid workers distributing aid. In the New York Times of 
February 2, an article about the food distribution coupons states, “On at least two days 
last week, United Nations troops used tear gas after a mass of men rushed the food 
distribution point and began grabbing what they could” (Cave and Thompson 2010). The 
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use of MINUSTAH and military force during aid distribution and in the camps is a means 
of controlling and supervising Haitian bodies and Haitians are constructed as threats to 
themselves, to women, and to aid workers. 
Haitians as Threats to Themselves 
Haitian men are represented as rioting, looting and being generally violent. The 
earthquake caused massive chaos in which everyone in Haiti was a potential victim. The 
Times writes on January 18,  “Convoys of lorries headed for the city’s worst-hit areas last 
night but there were signs they had come too late to prevent another tragedy, with 
Haitians turning on each other” (New York Times 2010). In the first month after the 
earthquake hit, nearly every news article made a comment on either rioting or looting. 
The international community was deeply concerned with the insecurity caused by the 
earthquake and the subsequent rioting and looting, as well as the prisoners who escaped 
from the Haitian jails:  
UN officials believe the prisoners rioted after the quake, overwhelmed the guards 
and escaped, Anderson Cooper reported. "When you have criminals, bandits, 
assassins who terrorize the population - and we have all those types here – it’s a 
big problem for the country," the prison’s warden Alexandre Jean Herisse, told 
Cooper (CBS News 2010). 
 
An Associated Press article reads, “Fear of looters and robbers has been one of the 
factors slowing the delivery of aid” (2010) and a Christian Science Monitor article states, 
“Haiti earthquake: despite fears of rioting, US starts airdrops: The US military has held 
off on doing airdrops of food and water to victims of the Haiti earthquake, fearing they 
could set off riots. But it now has troops in place to secure airdrop zones” (2010). The 
articles portray Haitian men as people to fear; the male body is seen as a threat to the 
order of things.  
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The discursive representation of Haitians, especially Haitian males as violent 
security threats not only justified the intervention, but also made it seem necessary, as if 
the international community had to secure the situation. The discursive representation of 
Haiti and Haitians as dangerous, desperate and lawless left little room for alternative 
ways of responding to the earthquake. When I tell people I am writing about the use of 
military and security apparatuses to respond to the earthquake, most people respond with 
criticism. The military had to be deployed, “there was chaos”, “the Haitian government 
was unable to respond”, “there was looting and rioting”. No one seems to questions the 
assumption that Haitians are threats, risks, and bodies in need of securing against. I am 
not arguing that rioting and looting did not happen, nor that prisoners did not escape from 
jails, nor that Haiti was not turned upside down by the earthquake, nor that everyone 
remained calm and no one resorted to violence. However, I am questioning the focus on 
insecurity, violence, and theft by the media and humanitarian organizations and what the 
portrayal of Haitians in this light reveals about the power relations and the means of 
securing a population from itself.  
I also argue that the focus on insecurity was misguided, self-perpetuating, and 
racist. One example of the media portrayal of disasters, race and insecurity is from 
Hurricane Katrina. The photos and captions of two men, one black and one white, each 
carrying food from a grocery store provide a prime example of such framing. The caption 
under the black man describes the man as “looting” a grocery store, whereas the caption 
under the white man suggested he was salvaging food for his family. The example clearly 
exhibits the effects race has on public opinion and the media. Henry A. Giroux (2006), 
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quoting Zizek, examines how media representations of victims of Hurricane Katrina were 
racialized and a reflection of race relations in America: 
The philosopher, Slavoj Zizek, argued that “what motivated these stories were not 
facts, but racist prejudices, the satisfaction felt by those who would be able to say: 
“You see, Blacks really are like that, violent barbarians under the thin layer of 
civilization!”(2005). It must be noted that there is more at stake here than the 
resurgence of old-style racism; there is the recognition that some groups have the 
power to protect themselves from such stereotypes and others do not, and for 
those who do not—especially poor blacks—racist myths have a way of producing 
precise, if not deadly, material consequences. Given the public’s preoccupation 
with violence and safety, crime and terror merge in the all- too-familiar equation 
of black culture with the culture of criminality, and images of poor blacks are 
made indistinguishable from images of crime and violence. (176) 
 
The link between race and the portrayal of Haitian men as security threats is clear. Black 
men have long been framed as violent threatening. I will discuss the issue of race and 
gender further in the following section. 
Haitian Men as Security Threats to Haitian Women 
The media portrays women and children, lumped together in their vulnerability, as being 
the victims of Haitian male bodies. After the earthquake some headlines read “Children, 
women most endangered by post-quake chaos in Haiti”(Xinhua 2010) and “Haitian 
women become crime targets after quake” (ABC News 2010) and “Haitian girls face 
increased vulnerability after quake” (Guering 2010) Although it is true that women and 
children do have a higher level of vulnerability due to patriarchal power structures, it is 
problematic when all males are rendered as potential security threats, and all women as 
future rape victims. This obfuscates the multiple factors that contribute to the increase in 
violence in Haiti following the earthquake.  
The monolithic construction of gender into a binary of oppressor versus 
oppressed, man versus woman, has influenced humanitarian aid distribution in Haiti. As 
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men are framed as security threats and women as victims in need of protection, the 
humanitarian aid agencies and other distributors of aid have adjusted their policies 
accordingly. Women, who are portrayed as domestic, caring, and family-oriented are 
viewed as more capable of receiving microcredit disaster assistance. Women are also 
considered less likely to riot and resort to violence while they are waiting in line for aid 
packages for hours on end. The humanitarian organizations do not trust men to wait 
patiently in line, nor do they trust them to distribute the aid properly among their 
families. This fear of rioting has led to the preference for one gender (female) to receive 
humanitarian aid and assistance (New York Times 2010).  
Additionally, there is evidence of racism on an institutional level that suggests 
that the Haitian people need to be protected from themselves, especially the women from 
the men. In Gaytri Spivak’s seminal piece, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” (1985), Spivak 
made the now famous statement “white men saving brown women from brown men”(93). 
Although she made this statement a quarter of a decade ago and was referring to the 
abolition by the English of the suttee practice of women joining their deceased husbands 
on the funeral pyre during the Victorian era, it still rings true and is revealing of the 
manner in which the international community responded to the Haitian earthquake. Aid 
organizations gave preference to female Haitians in the distribution of aid as a means of 
protecting women from men who may turn violent while waiting in line. One of the main 
concerns of the humanitarian organizations operating in Haiti’s was the rape of women 
and children. Countless media articles were devoted to the increased number of in rapes 
in the aftermath of the earthquake. One Christian Science Monitor article is titled “As if 
providing food, shelter, and postquake health services wasn’t tough enough, Haiti relief 
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workers are also focusing on keeping women from being raped as frustrations grow in 
Port-au-Prince’s tent cities” (2010). In a similar vein, the Australian newspaper, Herald 
Sun writes, “BANDITS are preying on Haiti earthquake survivors, even raping women, 
in camps set up after the disaster” (2010). Most dramatically, The Independent writes 
“Death, destruction ... and now rape” (2010).  
The framing of Haitian women as vulnerable victims and Haitian men as security 
threats who are undeserving of aid is problematic and potentially damaging. It denies the 
agency of both men and women who were affected by the disaster by reducing them to 
either deserving or undeserving, victims or perpetrators. It also has the grave potential of 
creating a self-fulfilling prophecy in which men either begin to view themselves as the 
security threats they are treated as and behave accordingly, or that by denying them 
access to the services of aid organizations they will be pushed even further into 
desperation and towards desperate acts. 
Haitians as Threats to Aid Workers 
An article titled, Aid for the Aid Givers by Lieutenant General Louis Lillywhite, describes 
how the health and safety of the humanitarian aid workers is an increasing concern for 
aid agencies and governments. Preventing attacks against aid workers is now a major 
theme for humanitarian organizations. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon describes the 
“threat environments” as: 
differentiated by the lack or presence of political motivation. The first is in areas 
of general unrest where attacks on UN and humanitarian personnel are an 
extension of the violence being experienced by the civilian population, either as 
the target of local criminals, organised crime or by individuals in an unending 
search for survival. It is the second environment which should be of particular 
concern to the international community. It is in these zones, where the threats are 
essentially political or politically related, that UN and humanitarian personnel are 
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increasingly targeted by extremists, armed groups and disenfranchised elements in 
multiple areas of operation. (Lillywhite 2011: 13).  
 
This article does not specifically address Haiti, but humanitarian organizations are 
restructuring policies and programs to maintain the safety of their aid workers 
internationally. In “unstable environments,” the protection of aid workers is a top 
priority; organizations are increasingly hiring private security firms, and have bodyguards 
and armored cars. Even though Haiti is not a “war-zone,” it is considered a “failed state” 
and a conflict zone and therefore the aid workers are in need of protection from the 
potential threats presented by Haitians.  
 Security as a mechanism of governmentality manifests itself differently in 
different spheres of life. For an internally displaced Haitian, security is more related to a 
form of biopower, an increase in control and surveillance for the purpose of ameliorating 
the threat posed by a population. Security means “peacekeeping” troops occupying a 
country for over ten years and differences in access to goods based on gender, or “level 
of vulnerability.” For aid workers, however, security manifests itself differently, although 
even for aid workers, security measures entail an increase in control and surveillance. As 
security presents itself as a dominating discourse in humanitarian aid distribution, aid 
workers are affected by the security measures from 9:00 p.m. curfews, to armored cars, to 
hourly “security situation” text messages.  
However, the difference comes back to the questions asked at the beginning of 
this chapter: Whose lives matter? As Butler suggests, 
 
Lives are supported and maintained differently, and there are radically different 
ways in which human physical vulnerability is distributed across the globe. 
Certain lives will be highly protected, and the abrogation of their claims to 
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sanctity will be sufficient to mobilize the forces of war. Other lives will not find 
such fast and furious support and will not even qualify as “grievable” (2004: 32) 
 
Haitians as homo sacers, as exceptional bodies caught in the extremes of poverty and 
suffering, as a population used to violence, death and misery are ultimately less grievable 
than aid workers from Western countries. There are no mass graves for international aid 
workers. There are no obituaries for the deceased Haitians. Security for aid workers 
means keeping them alive and protecting them from the Haitian threat. Security for 
Haitians means containment. 
The humanitarian industry, by framing Haitian men as security threats and Haitian 
women and international aid workers as needing protection, is better able to enact a 
heightened level of control over the aid distribution process and the lives of the Haitian 
people. This unequal power distribution allows the international organizations to have 
almost complete control of the distribution of food and water, sleeping arrangements, as 
well as the “security” of the population. Haitians are discursively constructed and 
represented as security threats, and, as I discuss in the final section, Haiti is constructed 
as an insecure, failed state. 
Threats to the World Order-The construction of Haiti as a “Failed State” 
 What constitutes a threat to the international order, to the security of the system of 
the nation-states? The nation-state system, which blankets the world with a patchwork 
quilt of ostensibly equally sovereign states, is the twentieth century’s attempt to eliminate 
minorities, to give states to all “legitimate” nations and to create a system of states that all 
follow similar rules and norms. If a state does not follow the rules and norms of the 
“civilized,” modern world, what is it? How should the “international community” 
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respond? States that do not comply, states that do not fit into the blanket, states that are 
failed, rogue, fragile or weak are considered threats to the system. Failed states are seen 
as breeding grounds for international terrorism, for illicit drug smuggling, for refugees 
and economic migrants. Bad governance makes one a bad neighbor. The problems of the 
failed states spill over into the less failed, more stable states, creating insecurity and 
havoc. Threatening their own stability and security, the infiltration of “the other” (e.g. 
refugees, immigrants) disrupts the legitimacy of the nation and creates a less homogenous 
state. The failed state is more than just a security threat because of terrorism and drugs. 
The failed state represents a breakdown in the system of nation-states and produces 
fissures in the ostensible desire of the United Nations to give all states equal and absolute 
sovereignty, because as addressed earlier, absolute national sovereignty does not and can 
not exist. 
 Labeling a state failed, fragile, weak or rogue, and identifying it as a threat to 
national and international security, allows for an increase in military and humanitarian 
intervention. The failed state label becomes a mechanism that allows some states to 
decide what it means to be a state and to increase the control of the international 
community in the failed state. Once a state is labeled “failed,” it is no longer considered a 
legitimate nation-state.   
The Failed State in International Relations Theory 
Failed states, not so long ago, were discussed as a problem of foreign aid or social 
theory. Only prescient thinkers and policy makers identified them as a priority of 
national security. The atrocities of September 11, 2001, did not make failed states a 
problem but very much did trigger recognition that severe civic dysfunction in one 
part of the globe  might well have consequences elsewhere. An Afghanistan or a 
Somalia has first and final responsibility for its own future. At the same time, so 
widely can such a state spread disruption that “its” affairs and “ours” now can be 
said to be segregated only in a carefully  qualified way. New alertness about 
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national security has brought an unprecedented increase in creative analysis of the 
problem: What to do about failed states? (Grant 2004: 1) 
 
The prescient thinkers of the failed state as a security threat certainly had foresight about 
the implications of state failure on Western countries’ perceptions of state security, 
though perhaps not in the way Grant has suggested. Instead of foreseeing that failed 
states would become security threats, international relations theories have influenced the 
construction of what exactly is a threat to state security. The 2002 National Security 
Strategy (NSS) of the United States explicitly states that failed (or in this case “weak”) 
states are a threat to American national security: 
“The events of September 11, 2001, taught us that weak states, like Afghanistan, 
can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states. Poverty does not 
make poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions, and 
corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels 
within their borders” (NSS 2002: 4).  
 
The weak and fragile state is viewed as a security threat to the developed world and as 
such it is in the interest of the Western countries to help develop failed and weak states. 
Additionally, failed states cost the international community money. USAID reports that 
failed states “can be costly in financial as well as human terms. The UN estimates that the 
eight most expensive cases of state collapse in the 1990s cost the international 
community $250 billion” (2003: 18). 
 Seth D. Kaplan, one of the most well-known and prolific scholars of fragile states, 
writes extensively on how to better “develop” fragile states. In the Fixing Fragile States 
insert he writes, 
Fragile states are a menace. Their lawless environments spread instability across 
borders, provide havens for terrorists, threaten access to natural resources, and 
consign millions of people to poverty. But Western attempts to reform these 
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benighted places have rarely  made things better... to avoid revisiting the carnage 
and catastrophes seen in places like Iraq, Bosnia, and the Congo, the West needs to 
rethink its ideas on  fragile states and start helping their peoples build 
governments and states that actually fit the local landscape (Kaplan 2008).  
 
Kaplan’s approach, which I will explore in detail, reflects the strategy most scholars and 
policymakers have on “developing” failed and fragile states. Although he claims to offer 
an alternative approach, his assumptions about what fragile states are—“countries unable 
to administer their territories effectively” (5) - and the way of “fixing” them- only a 
sustained and coherent program lasting generations, led by one outside power, and 
featuring significant foreign involvement in the management of governing bodies and 
security forces and large investments in the education of local elites can hope to pay 
dividends” (31)—are strikingly similar to past and current interventions in failed states.  
 Kaplan argues that a lack of “social cohesiveness” is one of the main factors that 
influence state failure and weakness. In a chart comparing state characteristics, he lists 14  
properties of fragile states (see table below) 
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The first characteristic that is listed is “formed around cohesive group with shared 
identity,” while the second is “common national identity.” Throughout Fixing Fragile 
States the need for a “national identity” crops up again and again. For Kaplan, bad 
governance comes from not having a cohesive national identity.  
 However, it is important to note that Kaplan does not describe Haiti as a “fragile 
state.” It instead refers to Haiti as failed. “A completely failed state - such as Somalia, 
Haiti, Liberia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)- is one where the state has 
withered away in the face of violence, warlordism, or criminal activity” (Kaplan 2008: 5). 
Kaplan’s characterization of state fragility is still useful for understanding discourses 
about Haiti, because despite the fact that Kaplan says Haiti is not fragile, the only reason 
it is not is because the state has “completely withered away.” If we use Kaplan’s 
understanding of state fragility, as if there is a distinct path from stability to instability, 
Haiti lies at the very end of the spectrum. But what does Kaplan’s first characteristic of 
state fragility – i.e. “Formed around diverse populations with little shared history”- mean 
in the case of Haiti? At first glance, it might seem that Kaplan leaves Haiti out because it 
does not fit this definition, but if one takes into account the extreme class distinctions in 
Haiti, and the extremely long history of class divisions between the very rich and the very 
poor, perhaps his analysis is legitimate. Unfortunately, Kaplan is more likely referencing 
ethnic diversity. 
 Robert I. Rotberg is another prolific scholar on the failed state. In his dramatic 
book, State Failure and State Weakness in a TIME OF TERROR (2003) Rotberg takes a 
slightly different approach to understanding state failure than Kaplan. Rotberg recognizes 
that state failure is more complex than ethnic diversity. “Failed states are tense, deeply 
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conflicted, dangerous and contested bitterly by warring factions” (5). Rotberg outlines 
both the causes and indicators of failed states, though the differences between the two are 
obfuscated. The “causes” and “indicators” of state failure include the tendency to have 
“more potholes” in roads and privatized educational and health systems, which can only 
be accessed by the upper class (7). Rotberg also cites corruption as an indicator of state 
failure. “Corruption flourishes in many states, but in failed states it often does so on an 
unusually destructive scale” (8). Another indicator of state failure is a low or declining 
GDP. It seems almost a moot point to suggest that many if not all states exhibit at least 
some of these characteristics. In many, many countries, the United States included, 
quality healthcare and education is limited to those who can afford it, and one would be 
hard-pressed to find a single country without potholes in its roads. But Rotberg’s analysis 
is problematic on another level. States that are deemed failed, fragile, weak or rogue do 
have more extreme problems. It is difficult to find a road in post-earthquake Haiti without 
potholes, and in fact, “potholes” do not begin to describe road conditions there. 
Carrefour, a “suburb” of Port Au Prince, according to Google maps, is nine kilometers 
from Port Au Prince and should take twelve minutes to reach, but in reality the roads are 
so impassable it can take up to two hours. Haiti is extremely corrupt, and access to any 
kind of healthcare or education is and was extremely limited, even before the earthquake. 
The problem with Rotberg’s analysis is not that these things happen everywhere, but that 
they are not the causes of state failure. Although I argue in this paper that the failed state 
is a construction of the international community, there are reasons why Haiti is one of the 
poorest countries in the world. Although it would be foolhardy to blame the international 
community entirely for impoverishing the world, it is equally ridiculous to not even 
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mention Western countries’ involvement in the underdevelopment of Haiti (other than 
referencing how corrupt politicians have misused international aid money).  
Haiti as a Failed, Fragile, Weak or Rogue State 
Locating Haiti in international relations debates about state failure and weakness is 
difficult because in many ways it does not fit the normal mold of the failed state as a 
security threat. On one hand, it fits the definitions by think-tanks and government policy 
makers. The United States Government Accountability Office defines failed and failing 
states as “nations where governments effectively do not control their territory, citizens 
largely do not perceive the government as legitimate, and citizens do not have basic 
public services or domestic security” (GAO 2007: 5). The Center for Global 
Development defines fragile states as poor countries that have difficulties performing the 
core functions of statehood, security, services, and legitimate government. They also 
have a lack of capacity and a lack of political will (Carment, Press and Stamy 2010). The 
National Security Council defines “weak states” as lacking “the capacity to fulfill their 
sovereign responsibilities,” and argues that weak states, “do  not have enforcement, 
intelligence, or military capabilities to assert control over their entire territory” (National 
Security for Combating Terrorism 2003: 20). Haiti fits into each of these categories. 
However, when theorists attempt to understand why states fail, Haiti is seen as an 
anomaly. According to Rotberg,   
Haiti has always been on the edge of failure, particularly during the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. But its entrenched weaknesses include no ethnic, religious or 
other communal cleavages. There are no insurgent movements. Nor has Haiti 
experienced radical or rapid deflation in standards of living and expectations, like 
Argentina in 2002 and Russia in the 1990s. Haiti has always been the poorest polity 
in the Western Hemisphere.  
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And,  
Haiti, even under President Aristide (1990-91, 1994-96, 2001- [2004]), [was] 
gripped in a vise of weakness. Yet given very limited organized internal dissidence 
and almost no internal ethnic, religious or linguistic cleavages within Haitian 
society - except a deep distrust by the majority of the upper classes, and of mulattos 
because of their  historic class affiliations - the ingredients of major civil strife are 
absent. Failure demands communal differences capable of being transformed into 
consuming cross-group violence. Haiti thus seems condemned to remain weak, but 
without failing (2004: 19-20). 
 
 Organizations, such as the World Bank and Foreign Policy magazine with the Fund 
for Peace, have made attempts to quantify failed and weak states and rank each state 
accordingly. The World Bank uses Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) 
and Low Income Countries under Stress (LICUS) to rank states based on a set of criteria. 
The World Bank created the CPIA to help decide on resource allocation. The CPIA 
measures sixteen criteria based on four clusters, economic, social, structural and the 
public sector. According to worldbank.org, “The CPIA measures the extent to which a 
country’s policy and institutional framework supports sustainable growth and poverty 
reduction, and consequently the effective use of development assistance. The outcome of 
the exercise yields both an overall score and scores for all of the sixteen criteria that 
compose the CPIA” (The World Bank 2010). Therefore, the World Bank determines 
which states are more fragile than others and then allocates funds accordingly. 
Foreignpolicy.com and the Fund for Peace have been publishing The Failed State Index 
since 2005, and characterize failed states as the “world’s most vulnerable nations.” 
Foreign Policy examines twelve indicators, such as demographics, refugee flows, 
economic development, and intervention. Foreign policy uses the Conflict Assessment 
System Tool (CAST) to calculate The Failed State Index by rating twelve indicators, 
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assessing state institutions, identifying surprise factors, and mapping conflicts and in 
relation to the “failed state” index. According to Foreign Policy’s 2010 Failed State 
Index, Haiti ranks number eleven, falling directly behind Pakistan. Somalia takes first 
place for the third year in a row, followed by Chad and Sudan. According to a Rand 
report, “A National Academy of Public Administration report of 2006 on why foreign aid 
has failed in Haiti summarized general donor opinion which has variously characterized 
Haiti as a nightmare, predator, collapsed, failed, failing, parasitic, kleptocratic, phantom, 
virtual or pariah state” (2010). The RAND report is particularly interesting, because it 
reveals the social construction of “the failed state” and the lack of consistency in how to 
“label” Haiti. The international community sees Haiti as a failed state and this has a 
profound effect on how states and international humanitarian agencies interact with Haiti 
and the Haitian population. 
 Although it may initially seem counterproductive to my argument, in the following 
section I will use academic and media articles which suggest that Haiti fulfills most, if 
not all, the qualifications of a “failed state.” By doing this, I hope to explore how most 
international relations theories are misguided in their understanding of state failure and 
their assumption about what it means for the system of nation-states. Instead of failed 
states being a threat to the security of wealthier, stronger, more stable states, these failed 
weak fragile and rogue states are a threat to the very system of nation-states. By threat to 
the system I do not mean the human security of residents, nor the sanctity of the border, 
but to the legitimacy of the system itself. 
 What makes a failed, fragile, weak state? Even without delving into the problematic 
mixture of causes and effects, what are the characteristics? For the Failed State Project at 
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Purdue University state failure is defined “by the patterns of governmental collapse 
within a nation which often bring demands (because of the refugees they foster, the 
human rights they abridge and their inability to forestall starvation and disease) which 
threaten the security of their surrounding states and region” (quoted in Rotberg 2003: 24). 
According to most other sources, failed states are, as noted above, states that are unable 
to provide basic services for their citizens. Of course, there are thirty other definitions and 
terms to describe the basic premise of state failure and state weakness, but for 
simplicity’s sake this thesis will focus on these definitions. Failed states are framed as 
having problems with drug smuggling, inefficient bureaucracies, producing a vast 
number of refugees and migrants, and being hotbeds for international terrorism. In the 
following section I will describe how Haiti has experienced, or is perceived to experience 
all of the following problems. 
Drug Smuggling 
Drug smuggling, a major issue in Western media because of the “War on Drugs,” is seen 
not just as the infiltration of illegal drugs into countries, but also a lack of control of 
borders. The borders of failed states are seen as extremely fluid and unregulated, 
allowing for the passage of persons and other illicit materials. This makes Western 
borders even more difficult to patrol and securitize. In an article about “Haiti’s Drug 
Problem,” the United States Institute of Peace writes,  
The remaining ten percent of illicit drugs is shipped through central and eastern 
Caribbean. In recent years, successful enforcement efforts in Jamaica have reduced 
trafficking through that country. At the same time, President Chavez’s anti-
American  policies have reduced counter-narcotics cooperation and resulted in 
sharply increased cocaine shipments from Venezuela through Haiti and the 
Dominican Republic on the  Island of Hispaniola. U.S. government agencies 
estimate that 83 metric tons or about eight percent of the cocaine entering the 
United States in 2006 transited either Haiti or the Dominican Republic. Haiti has 
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1,200 miles of unprotected coastline and 225 miles of un-patrolled land border. 
Drug shipments by "fast boats" and small planes land at tiny ports and on 
clandestine airstrips scattered along Haiti’s southern coast. Haiti’s under-strength 
and dysfunctional police force is unable to respond to the challenge, as traffickers 
often take as little as five minutes to offload their cargo and refuel. Haiti’s tiny 
coast guard has only two patrol boats, 95 personnel, and no air assets. Corruption 
among Haiti’s law enforcement authorities is common. A near-record seizure of 
925 pounds of cocaine on May 31, 2007 in the coastal town of Loegane highlights 
these problems. The drugs were discovered at a roadside checkpoint in vehicles 
with government license plates. Five police officers were among the ten people 
arrested (USIP 2007) 
 
Inefficient Bureaucracies, Corrupt Politicians and Undemocratic Elections 
 Corruption, elections and bad bureaucracies go hand in hand and each can be an 
indicator of a failed state, though, many countries that are not labeled as failed experience 
these problems as well. In many ways, Haiti is a prime example of each of these issues. It 
is difficult to find an article about Haiti that does not mention the word “corruption.” 
Haiti is considered to be corrupt from top to bottom. Whether it is politicians misusing 
aid funds or military and police forces taking bribes or intimidating citizens into 
extracting bribes, there is no end to stories about the misuse of funds. One question that is 
often asked of developing countries, especially Haiti, is why, after billions of dollars in 
aid money, development projects, and international trade, are these countries still poor 
and sometimes getting poorer.  One relatively quick and easy answer is corruption and, as 
the RAND report suggests, political culture.  
 The Interim Haiti Recovery Commission was established because of the 
international community’s concerns about the inability of the Haitian state to manage and 
efficiently use the billions of dollars donated to the rebuilding effort. The lack of 
infrastructure, corruption and “political culture” are considered reflections of the failure 
of the Haitian state and barriers to rebuilding. The RAND report, Rebuilding the Haitian 
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State remarks, “Haiti’s poverty, like its governmental weakness, is a product of its 
political culture” (RAND 2010: 47). The RAND report also argues that,   
Historically, the Haitian state has served as an apparatus by which elites extract 
rents from the impoverished population, not as a means of serving Haiti’s citizens. 
Corruption  is a serious problem; Haiti ranked 168 of 180 in Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index in 2008, in the same league as Iran 
and Turkmenistan. Since 2002, when it was first included in the rankings, it has 
slipped slightly, from the 87th percentile to the 93rd. Haiti also ranks very low on 
broader governance indicators (46).  
 
In 2007 the USAID operational planned summary focused much of its attention on the 
corruption in Haiti. Several anti-corruption programs were started because, as it suggests, 
“Haiti has suffered from bad governance for decades. Corruption is endemic and state 
resources are diverted; local governance is ignored; and Parliament often does not 
function. To avoid political unrest, Haiti urgently needs to become a democratic, well-
governed state” (USAID 2007: 12).  
Haitian Refugees and Migrants 
A large exodus of displaced persons, regardless of their reasons for exit (war, economics, 
famine, or individual persecution) is seen as symptomatic of state failure and fragility. 
The state is no longer able to provide services for its people and they are forced to leave 
their country for another. A 1992 Foreign Policy article suggests that as states begin to 
fail and start to become more violent they “imperil their own citizens and threaten their 
neighbors through refugee flows” (Helman and Ratner 1992: 3). International 
humanitarian law and domestic policy-makers are generally unsure about how to 
intervene in cases of massive migration movements. However, there have been several 
interventionist attempts that have been spurned at least partially by refugee flows. In 
Dowety and Loescher in Refugee Flows as Grounds for International Action (1997) 
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suggest that the unilateral interventions in Haiti were influenced by a desire to curb 
refugee flows. UN resolutions in 1994 included the need to end military behavior that 
was causing Haitian displacement. 
The U.S. government at this point was impelled to push for a quick resolution to the 
situation, in part because of the continuing embarrassment and political difficulties 
of dealing with Haitian refugees and would-be refugees. In his public address on 
the eve of intervention, President Clinton stressed the need “to secure our borders 
and preserve stability in our hemisphere,” adding more specifically: “We have a 
particular interest in stopping brutality when it occurs so close to our shores.... As 
long as Cedras rules, Haitians will continue to seek sanctuary in our nation. This 
year, in less than two months, more than 21,000 Haitians were rescued at sea by our 
Coast Guard and Navy. Today more than 14,000 refugees are living at our naval 
base in Guantanamo. The American people have already spent $177 million to 
support them” (Dowety and Loescher 1996: 64).  
 
This quote is of extreme importance to this thesis because I argue that failed states are 
constructed as security threats in order to justify intervention. The portrayal of refugees 
and displaced persons as threats plays a large part in the construction of Haiti and the 
failed state as security threats that need or deserve or require intervention. 
International Terrorism 
Although there has been plenty of “terrorism” within Haiti, there has been no 
“international terrorism” to speak of. There have been no Haitian bombings of United 
States or other foreign cities and buildings, and there does not seem to be an anti-west 
movement that operates inside of Haiti. However, the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) suggests that without proper diligence this may change: 
Haiti’s porous borders and less-than-sufficient controls create an environment that 
trans-border criminal networks tend to exploit, including some well-documented 
cases. More importantly, while Haiti has been spared major terrorist incidents so 
far, the lack of control makes Haiti a convenient “back office” that international 
terrorist networks might exploit in the future for training and planning action on 
foreign targets. The attraction of  Haiti is likely to increase with the robust 
counter-terrorist and border security measures being taken in most other countries 
in the world (IOM 2007). 
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I think the previous examples show that even before the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, Haiti 
was considered, at least by policymakers, governments, and the media, as a failed state 
and because of this failed state status, a threat to the national security of the United States 
and other neighboring countries. 
Risk 
Failed states are risky. There is a great amount of uncertainty not only about what failed 
states are, but also how they will behave, what their populations will do, and the 
implications of state failure to the international community. The calculation of what 
constitutes a security threat relies on a calculation of risk and speculation about what 
might potentially occur to threaten a society. There has been a proliferation of scholarly 
examination of what constitutes the “new”, or post-Cold War, or post-9/11 threats or 
risks. According to Aradau, 
Risk-based perspectives to security differ considerably from their threat-based 
counterparts in how they approach the question of security and in the policy 
prescriptions and governmental technologies they instantiate. Whereas the latter 
tend to emphasize agency and intent between conflicting parties, risk-based 
interpretations tend to emphasize systemic characteristics, such as populations at 
risk of disease or environmental hazard. Moreover, threat-based interpretations rely 
on intelligence in an attempt to eliminate danger, while risk relies on actuarial-like 
data, modeling and speculations that do not simply call for the elimination of risk 
but develop strategies to embrace it. In short, whereas the concept of threat brings 
us in to the domain of the production, management and destruction of dangers, the 
concept of risk mobilizes and focuses on different practices that arise from the 
construction, interpretation and management of contingency (2008: 148). 
 
The construction of the failed state as a security threat is the result of risk calculations. 
Failed states are risky because they are unpredictable. The do not fit into the normal 
category of the “nation-state” that has been constructed as the legitimate means of 
governing territories. Their problems spill over into neighboring countries, and cause 
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forced migration, terrorism, and drug smuggling. They threaten the very system of 
nation-states.  
 That there are multiple definitions and nomenclatures for the “failed state” and that 
no one is entirely sure which states are actually “failed” and which are “fragile” or 
“weak” or “rogue” reveals the risk calculation involved. Risks are unpredictable and they 
are also impossible to control and, as Aradau (2008) suggests, the construction and 
interpretation of risk is more important than the elimination of threat. In the case of Haiti, 
as the IOM quote earlier suggests, there is a possibility that Haiti will become a haven for 
terrorists. The fear that Haitians would flood into the United States following the 
earthquake was not realized, but the risk of it happening was of great concern to US 
policymakers and politicians. Additionally, as the above quote suggests “systematic 
characteristics” are a foundation for the construction of risks. The failed, fragile state 
discourse focuses almost entirely on pinpointing the “characteristics” of failed states, and 
how they are systematic to the state, or the culture, or the people. For example, the 
Haitian people (or state, or politicians) suffer from systematic corruption. Characterizing 
failed states, creating charts, as Kaplan does, or ranking them, such as 
Foreignpolicy.com’s Failed State Index does, relies on calculating risks and constructing 
systematic characteristics of state failure. 
 Failed states are also constructed as risks because of the anxiety felt by the 
“international community” about the weakening of the “state.” State failure, coupled with 
the growth in power of a global political order, such as the increasing control by 
international non-governmental organizations has led to the fear that the state is 
“withering away.” As Doty suggests in Anti-Immigrantism in Western Democracies,  
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What has become known as the “globalization thesis” suggests that states have been 
weakened in the sense that they are often unable to fully control the movement of 
goods, capital, people, and culture, which are all elements of globalization. Losing 
control over borders erodes the effectiveness of states, undermines their 
sovereignty, and by extension raises questions about the type of international 
system that might be occurring (2003: 5).  
The failed states offers a particularly difficult risk for states because one of their 
fundamental “characteristics” is that they do not have control over their territories and 
borders, and the porousness of their borders directly affects the inflow of goods and 
people into non-failed states. Also, on a different level, the failed state discourse brings 
up questions about what to do with those unfortunate failed states. They challenge the 
legitimacy of the nation-state system, because part of that system rests on the idea of each 
state having absolute state sovereignty.  
 In his piece on the governmentality of unease, Didier Bigo discusses how the 
construction of threats and risks is not just the result of xenophobia or distrust of 
immigrants, but is also the result of politicians, media, and bureaucrats constructing them. 
As Bigo argues, 
the securitization of the immigrant as a risk is based on our conception of the state 
as a body or a container for the polity. It is anchored in the fears of politicians about 
losing their symbolic control over the territorial boundaries. It is structured by the 
habitus of the security professionals and their new interests not only in the 
foreigner, but in the “immigrant.” These interests are correlated with the 
globalization of technologies of surveillance and control going beyond the national 
borders. It is based, finally, on the “unease” that some citizens who feel discarded 
suffer because they cannot cope with the uncertainties of everyday life. This worry, 
or unease is not psychological. It is a structural unease in a “risk society” framed by 
neoliberal discourses in which freedom is always associated at its limits with 
danger and (in)security (2002: 65). 
Although Bigo is discussing immigration directly, I think the theory can be applied to the 
failed state as well, and not just because of the immigrants it produces, but because of the 
general unease that is felt about failed states. State failure is hotly debated and discussed, 
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and as the NSS report suggested in 2002, the “weak” state is one of the greatest threats to 
national security. 
 The insistence that there are “good” states and “bad” states is a fundamental aspect 
of governmentality and sovereignty. The ability to decide which states are good and 
which are bad rests in the hands of the sovereign and is dependent on the ability to 
distinguish between the two, and act on the basis of this distinction. If a country that is 
“failed” poses no real threat (via terrorism, drugs, or immigration) is it truly a threat? 
Perhaps yes, because, as Aradau suggests, it may become a threat in the future or it 
possesses the necessary qualities of being a risk. 
Representational Power 
Finally, I wish to explore the significance of how countries are represented in the global 
order. Understanding why some states are “failed” or “fragile” is not just about 
pinpointing the characteristics of a “failed” state, but instead should explore the power 
dynamics and assumptions behind the act of labeling a state “failed,” as well as the global 
structures that have encouraged and/or discouraged failure or underdevelopment. 
Although it would be easy to suggest that, regardless of what one calls a state without a 
legitimate government, or a state with prolonged conflict, or a state that lacks the ability 
to enforce human rights and the security of its citizens, the state is still unable to provide 
for its citizens. The name or label does not change the state’s inabilities and failures as a 
state. However, as I discussed earlier in this chapter, the act of labeling is not only a 
reflection of global structures, inequalities, and relations. Labeling also affects how 
governments, nonprofit organizations and individuals understand what it means to be 
“legitimate” and the programs and policies which are designed to address not only the 
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rebuilding of the failed state, but also the needs and abilities of individuals who reside in 
the fragile state. The performativity of labeling “failed” states is a reflection of global 
power structures and discourses. 
 Underestimating the power of discourse and knowledge construction in a discussion 
of failed states would deny not only the power to decide what constitutes a “good” or 
“strong” state but how discourses determine and validate foreign intervention, 
humanitarian or otherwise.  
 The construction of North and South identities is not a new phenomenon, but 
different terms come in and out of vogue. During the Cold War there were three worlds. 
From the 1970s on, countries were labeled “developing” and “developed.” Academia has 
also had its fair share: Wallerstein labeled them the core, the semi periphery and the 
periphery, and now it fashionable in some circles to say the Global North and the Global 
South. Derrida (2005) explores the concept of the “rogue state” and by relating it to 
Schmitt’s sovereign exception and Kant’s idea that “the reason of the strongest is always 
best.” Derrida describes the sovereign exception as,  
the de facto situation, the relations of force (military, economic, technoscientific, 
and so on) and the differences of force end up determining through their intrinsic 
effectiveness a world law that, in the aftermath of a world war, is in the hands of 
certain sovereign states that are more powerful than other sovereign states (100).  
 
Derrida argues that there are “(no) more rogue states” because “as soon as there is 
sovereignty, there is abuse of power and a rogue state. Abuse is the law of use; it is the 
law itself, the “logic” of a sovereignty that can reign only by not sharing” (2005: 102). 
There are no rogue states because all states are rogue. 
 The construction of “failed states” is an exercise in deciding the exception. Failed 
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states like Rwanda, Somalia and Haiti are considered nation-states that no longer have 
functioning democratic governments. The definition of a functioning democratic 
government, as well as the ability to structure, label, and designate states as either failed 
or real, is derived from the sovereign exception. Nation-states are built on the premise of 
the ability of a state to govern and protect its own interests. The normative definition of 
legitimate states posits the nation and the sovereignty of the nation as the most important 
and defining feature within the geographical boundaries of states. However, as Derrida 
has suggested, some states are more sovereign than others and this allows them to decide 
what the exception is. In the case of a system of nation-states, the international 
community has the ability or the right to decide on the exception and the norm, in this 
case state failure. By deciding the exception, the state also decides the rule. The contrast 
between “real” states, such as the United States, and failed states, such as Haiti, allows 
for the denial of “sovereign rights.” When a state becomes a failed, rogue, or fragile state 
it becomes a threat to international stability. 
 The relationship between power and knowledge, as explored by Foucault (1994), 
helps to conceptualize the creation of the failed state in international relations. Foucault 
discusses how knowledge is created and sustained by power. Knowledge, argues 
Foucault, “circulates and functions in relation to power” (1994: 331). The “regime of 
knowledge” in the failed state discourses is used to create an understanding of what it 
means to be a good or bad state and the role of the state and government in individual 
societies. It relies on the assumption that the Western style of rationalization and 
individualization is the preferred and ideal way of organizing society. The international 
community, be it an international organization or a wealthy Western country, has the 
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power to conceptualize and create the knowledge of not only what represents a threat or a 
risk, but also the identities and labels of countries that are deemed threats and risks. 
 The modern system of nation-states relies on the stated assumption of ethnically 
homogenous, equally sovereign states as the only and ideal way of organizing societies. 
Additionally, the state is propagated as the set of institutions that must bestow its citizens 
with rights, services and protection. A “failed state” is the state that fails to fit into the 
model, the ideal. The failed state contradicts and threatens the system of nation-states and 
because of this, the failed state is constructed as both a risk and threat to the global order.  
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Conclusion 
Humanitarian intervention has become an important mode and even a dominant 
frame of reference for Western political intervention in global scenes of 
misfortune, both in cases of armed conflict and natural disasters and around their 
more or less direct consequences in the form of epidemics, famine, physical 
injury, and emotional trauma. No war is now without its humanitarian corridors 
and its humanitarian workers. And no Western military intervention into another 
country is now without its justification on humanitarian grounds (Fassin 
2007:508) 
 
The previous chapters have all focused on the humanitarian response to the internally 
displaced Haitians following the earthquake of 2010. I focused primarily on 
humanitarianism as a mechanism of security and the framing of displaced Haitians as 
security threats. I engaged with the discourses of the media and humanitarian 
organizations, as well as interviews conducted with aid workers in Haiti following the 
earthquake. Exploring the dynamic relationships of humanitarian organizations, the 
international community, the Haitian government and the internally displaced Haitians, I 
attempted to problematize the many assumptions about international humanitarian aid 
and the Haitian population.  
There were three major focuses of the thesis: the increasing use of security in the 
distribution of humanitarian aid, humanitarianism operating as a mechanism of security 
and the construction of meaning and threat.  I situated both Haiti and the humanitarian 
industry historically to illustrate that although the current situation may be unique or 
extreme in some ways (for example, the use of military to directly distribute aid, or that 
one million Haitians are still internally displaced), when situating these seemingly 
separate events historically, we can see they are the result of existing sets of relationships 
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and patterns and most importantly, how the increasing use of security as a technique of 
government is being manifested in humanitarianism.  
The first chapter engaged with humanitarianism as a form of political intervention 
and as a reflection of the presumed failure of a state to adequately respond to disasters 
and provide for its citizens. I described three particular epochs in humanitarian assistance 
and the ways in which global political power and changing conceptualizations of poverty, 
development and human rights have transformed humanitarian assistance. The chapter 
also detailed the history of intervention in Haiti to show how representations and 
discourses about Haiti as being “in need” of humanitarianism and intervention are 
grounded in past encounters with the international community. The genealogy of 
humanitarian intervention and Haiti’s history of intervention situated the response to the 
2010 earthquake within a socio-historical context to illuminate the complexities of 
humanitarianism and Haiti’s relationship with the international community. 
Understanding these complexities allows us to understand the response as not an isolated 
event, but a reflection of multiple processes, trends and associations between the “North” 
and the “South” and Haiti and the international community.  
The second chapter argued that humanitarianism, because of its particular 
relationship with sovereignty, power, and the global political order, and because of its 
bureaucratization, organizational structure and funding is functioning as a mechanism of 
governance and is increasingly operating as mechanism of security. By focusing on the 
Haitian IDP camp as a site of security, I attempted to show how humanitarianism works 
to monitor and control the IDP population in an attempt to create a more “secure” 
environment. Discourses about poverty and development are now tied to “security” and 
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humanitarian organizations operate under the assumption that without “security” there 
can be no development, human rights, or even aid distribution. However, how security 
mechanisms operate differs depending populations they engage. The lives of aid workers 
are secured in different ways than the lives of internally displaced Haitians. Aid and 
security are distributed based on levels of “vulnerability” and by constructing notions of 
who is deserving of humanitarian aid and who is not.  
The final chapter discussed the construction of Haitians and the Haitian state as a 
threat in need of security and humanitarian assistance. The discursive power of 
constructing realities about the Haitian population is a political act that reveals the power 
of some to determine the knowledges and understandings of others. Humanitarian 
organizations operating in Haiti have the ability to create and recreate the identities of 
Haitians as hopeless, caught in a vicious cycle of poverty and as threats to themselves, to 
Haitian women and to aid workers. The final chapter also discussed the construction of 
Haiti as a failed state, and the power of deciding what constitutes a functioning state 
versus what constitutes a failure to the system of nation-states. It argued that our 
perception of Haitians, especially Haitian males, as threats in need of securing against 
and the Haitian state as failed, fragile or rogue, is a reflection of the discourses and 
practices of the international community.  
Underlying this thesis is the power of telling a story and how knowledge and 
narration intersect with our understanding of events and actors. Our knowledge about the 
earthquake in Haiti in 2010 and the international humanitarian organizations, the 
international community and internally displaced Haitians is a reflection of the unequal 
power in the production of dominant discourses. Trouillot (1995), as mentioned in the 
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introduction, describes how power influences knowledge and narration. He focuses on 
the history of Haiti to illuminate the histories that have been kept silent, the histories that 
have created subjects and the histories that have influenced our current understandings of 
Haiti and Haitians. This thesis argues that dominant narratives about Haitians are a 
reflection of the power dynamics in knowledge construction and that those narratives 
influence not only how the world sees and understands Haiti, but also how the 
international community deals with Haiti. The construction of Haitians as being in need 
of intervention and security and as threats to be secured against allows for the 
international community, through humanitarian organizations, to engage with Haiti in a 
particular way. 
Throughout the thesis I made mention of my time in Haiti doing field research in 
July of 2010. For the most part I did not focus on the interviews I did there because I did 
not receive a surplus of objective empirical data. Instead, my time in Haiti gave me a 
clearer understanding of what life in Haiti is like for both Haitians and aid workers. 
Although I did do formal interviews with aid workers, I found casual discussions with 
people to be more informative. Therefore, most of my research included attending UN 
cluster meetings and speaking to aid workers, both domestic and international, about 
what their day to day lives were like and what security meant for them and for the people 
they were serving. In those situations people were generally more candid and willing to 
talk. As my time in Haiti went on I grew to understand the complexities of humanitarian 
assistance. Most of the aid workers were not only emotionally and physically exhausted, 
but they also expressed concern and frustration with their own organizations, as well as 
the Haitian government. This is representative of Barbara Harrell-Bond’s (2002) 
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assertion that giving aid can be detrimental to both the refugee (or in this case the IDP) 
and the aid worker and reveals the multiple ways and levels in which power is 
distributed. With that said, most of the aid workers I spoke with believed they were doing 
the right thing, and were happy to be able to help Haitians during their time in need. 
This leads me to another point, which is the question of intervention. For multiple 
reasons I did not give a definitive verdict for or against humanitarian intervention. I do 
not believe that doing so would be realistic or constructive. I do however, argue in this 
thesis that the current ways in which security is being articulated in humanitarian 
interventions is a problem, and that although there is no way I would ever argue all 
intervention is bad, I do believe we, meaning aid workers, scholars, refugees, donors, 
policy makers and anyone else involved in the humanitarian assistance process need to 
very seriously start rethinking our assumptions about humanitarianism and I believe this 
process of reimagining starts with our understanding of the people humanitarian 
organizations are helping and the relationship between the two. Until we dismantle the 
racist, sexist and classist perceptions about those in need of assistance, humanitarian aid 
will continue to fail to alleviate suffering, I recognize that not all humanitarian operations 
are failures, but I do believe there can be very different and more constructive ways of 
helping people who have been affected by a disaster, an emergency or a crisis and this 
process begins with understanding the relationships between the international community 
and the aid recipients. At some point in the thesis I state that behind international 
humanitarian assistance there echoes the sentiments of the failure of the state. I do not 
believe this is necessarily a bad thing either, because I also think that in order to improve 
humanitarian assistance we also need to reimagine what it means to be a citizen and the 
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relationship of the citizen and the state. I think that this includes the perceptions of threats 
and what it means for a population, or for a person to be a threat. 
The Haitians who were internally displaced by the earthquake in 2010 are not 
telling their own stories. Stories, like this thesis, are being told about them. Throughout 
this thesis I have attempted to highlight how discourses about Haitians and 
humanitarianism are both problematic and potentially damaging. How the world 
describes and understands the internally displaced Haitian both reflects and constructs the 
humanitarian programs and policies that affect the day-to-day lives of Haitians. The level 
of control that humanitarian organizations exert, and the lack of voice and representation 
of the majority of the displaced Haitians has created an environment in which security is 
framed as necessary and is not questioned. By constructing Haitians as threats to be 
secured against, humanitarian organizations, western media, and academics are 
eliminating other alternatives to providing assistance to people who have lost friends, 
family, their homes and their jobs. When humanitarianism operates as a mechanism of 
security it presents a displaced person first as a security threat and last as a person in need 
of help and assistance.  
The aim of this thesis was not just to argue that all humanitarianism is 
intervention, or that all Haitians are not security threats, but instead to explore how the 
dominant narratives about humanitarianism and Haitians are a reflection of the unequal 
power distribution of the international community and how those narratives construct to 
portray Haitians and internally displaced populations in a particular way to help justify 
political interventions, which in turn recreate and reconstruct the meanings and identities 
of the population. Deconstructing dominant narratives about humanitarianism allows for 
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a more nuanced exploration of what exactly humanitarianism is and how it functions as a 
mechanism of power, governance and security.  
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